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CRIMINOLOGY 
“CULTURAL DEFENSE,” “CULTURAL 
OFFENSE,” OR NO CULTURE AT ALL?: AN 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ISRAELI 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CULTURAL 
CONFLICT CRIMINAL CASES AND OF THE 
FACTORS AFFECTING THEM 
TAMAR TOMER-FISHMAN* 
 
This Article presents an empirical picture of judicial decisions in 
cultural conflict criminal cases and the factors affecting those decisions.  
Over fifty years of Israeli district court and Supreme Court criminal 
judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases are reviewed.  The research 
reveals that while the literature and public debate have mainly dealt with 
the question of whether a cultural defense is accepted or rejected by a 
court, two other central judicial decision patterns exist: (1) cultural 
offense—cases in which cultural background is a consideration for more 
severe punishment, as an indication of offense elements, or as a reason to 
reject a defense claim, and (2) disregard—cases in which the cultural 
background is ignored in guilt and punishment decisions, though judges are 
aware of it.  The findings also indicate that courts’ tendency not to consider 
cultural background in mitigation is strongly linked to power relationships 
between groups within the society and not due to lack of sufficient legal 
tools or a desire to protect liberal values, as commonly assumed in the 
literature.  These findings indicate that there are important issues, which 
have not gained adequate attention, that are significant for future academic 
 
* I am grateful to David Weisburd and Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi for their thoughtful 
comments on this work.  I would also like to thank The Minerva Center for Human Rights 
and The Israeli Society of Criminology for the financial support of this research. 
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and public debates on cultural conflict criminal cases, as well as for law 
and social practitioners. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Criminal courts in heterogeneous societies around the world, including 
the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Holland, Australia, and Israel, 
face cultural conflict situations.  Cultural conflict situations are situations in 
which different groups in society have different conduct norms for the same 
situation.  In cultural conflict situations, cultural minorities that act 
according to their cultural norms, values, and worldviews may be accused 
of committing crimes because the criminal law reflects the norms, values, 
and worldviews of the dominant groups.1  Examples of such cases are 
bigamy and family honor murder. 
The questions motivitating this research include (1) what  are the 
judicial decisions in cultural conflict criminal cases?; and (2) what are the 
judicial considerations in such cases?  For instance, how does the court 
react to someone accused of bigamy who claims that his religion allows or 
even encourages him to take a second wife?  What is the verdict when 
someone accused of murder claims that he acted in self-defense against life-
threatening witchcraft? 
Despite the fact that criminal courts have dealt with cultural conflict 
situations for more than one hundred years2 and the growing academic and 
public debates on cultural defense,3 no empirical research based on a 
sample of cases has been conducted on judicial decisions in cultural conflict 
cases.  The current research, therefore, empirically examines judicial 
decisions in cultural conflict criminal cases and the factors affecting those 
decisions. 
This Article begins with a review of the cultural defense debate.  It 
continues with a review of what is known about judicial decisions in 
cultural conflict cases.  Following that is a discussion of the various 
 
1 THORSTEN SELLIN, CULTURE CONFLICT AND CRIME 63-67 (1938). 
2 Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and 
Multiculturalists on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 56-57 
(1995). 
3 “Cultural defense” refers to the practice of presenting cultural arguments in court in 
order to negate or mitigate criminal responsibility or to mitigate punishment.  To date, no 
state has formally recognized a general cultural defense.  Cultural arguments, therefore, are 
raised through existing defenses such as provocation, necessity, duress, and self-defense.  
E.g., Alice J. Gallin, The Cultural Defense: Understanding the Policies Against Domestic 
Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723, 725 (1994); Alison D. Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural 
Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD., 437 (1993); Note, The 
Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986). 
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possibilities for addressing cultural conflict cases.  The Article then turns to 
examining the circumstances in which it is predicted that a cultural defense 
will be accepted.  The methodology and the findings are presented, and the 
Article concludes with a discussion of the implications for future academic 
and public debates as well as for practitioners’ work. 
A.  THE CULTURAL DEFENSE DEBATE 
In recent decades, we have witnessed a growing public and academic 
debate on cultural defense centered on whether, and to what extent, cultural 
background should negate or mitigate criminal responsibility and 
punishment.  This Section briefly presents the reasoning and arguments for 
and against considering cultural background as a mitigating circumstance. 
One reason to consider cultural background as a mitigating 
circumstance is multiculturalism.  The multicultural movement promotes 
respect for other cultures and strives to change political, legal, and 
economic arrangements in order to respect minority cultural rights and 
enable cultural minorities to preserve and develop their culture.4  While 
multiculturalism supports the use of cultural defense, it should be noted that 
cultural arguments were raised in courts long before the emergence of 
multiculturalism5 and multicultural philosophers hardly address cultural 
defense.6  Moreover, most multicultural scholars claim that cultural 
practices should not be recognized as legitimate to the extent that they limit 
individual liberties or are gender discriminative.7 
The argument that cultural practices should not be recognized if they 
limit individual liberties or are gender discriminative has been criticized for 
being based on value judgments of minority cultures, for promoting one 
culture over other cultures, and for presuming that Western values are 
 
4 YOSSI YONAH & YEHOUDA SHENHAV, RAV TARBUTIUT MAHI?  AL HAPOLITICA SHEL 
HASHONUT BEISRAEL [WHAT IS MULTICULTURALISM? ON THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN ISRAEL] 
(2005). 
5 Criminal courts have dealt with cultural arguments for over than a century.  See 
Maguigan, supra note 2, at 56.  Claghorn’s research from 1923, published in the book The 
Immigrant’s Day in Court, described a number of cases among Italian immigrants in the 
United States in which cultural arguments were accepted.  Id. at 57.  In the United Sates, 
during the 1960s, the cultural argument was raised in what was called “Social Framework 
Evidence” aimed to provide information on the social and psychological state of the accused.  
Id. at 58. 
6 ALISON RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004). 
7 E.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS (1996); Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7, 17-22 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha 
C. Nussbaum eds., 1999). 
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superior to other cultures.8  For instance, it was argued that the idea of 
human rights is not based on universal concepts but lies in Western and 
liberal perceptions.9  Likewise, it is problematic to limit cultural relativism 
based on the liberal idea of the harm principle because the definition of 
“harm” is culturally relativistic.  For instance, coining, the act of rubbing a 
coin on the back and chest of a child, is considered in Western societies as 
child abuse, but, among the Vietnamese, it is considered a healing 
treatment.10  Similarly, scarring a child’s face is considered an assault in 
Western societies but is considered a mark of group identity in some non-
Western societies.11 
While multiculturalism is one reason for considering cultural 
background as a mitigating circumstance, it is not necessarily the main 
one.12  An important reason for considering the cultural background of the 
defendant as a mitigating circumstance is individual justice.13  The principle 
of individual justice suggests that different people charged with the same 
crime should receive different treatments based on their relative moral guilt.  
Here, personal circumstances of the accused are presented at the sentencing 
phase in order to tailor the punishment to the moral guilt of the accused.  
Advocates of defendants’ rights, however, have thought that the individual 
justice approach should be extended to the guilt phase.  Under this 
approach, for instance, the battered spouse defense was recognized.14  It is 
claimed that the law should recognize the role that motive plays in crime 
when adjudicating guilt and punishment in order to assure that people are 
punished only as much as they deserve.15  According to the individual 
justice principle, the accused should be allowed to present his or her 
cultural background because when a person holds different cultural values 
than those of the legal system, his or her legal blameworthiness will not 
necessarily fit his or her moral blameworthiness.16 
 
8 Homi K. Bhabha, Liberalism’s Scared Cow, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR 
WOMEN?, supra note 7, at 83.  
9 See, e.g., Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights: A Critique, INT’L J. HUM. RTS., 
Summer 1997, at 41; R. Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? 
DIOGENES, Dec. 1982, at 75. 
10 RENTELN, supra note 6, at 57. 
11 Renteln, supra note 3. 
12 Id. at 439-40. 
13 RENTELN, supra note 6, at 187-89; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individual Justice 
Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1122 (1996); 
Renteln, supra note 3, at 439-40; Note, supra note 3, at 1298-311. 
14 Note, supra note 3, at 1299; Coleman, supra note 13, at 1116-17. 
15 Renteln, supra note 3, at 442-44.  
16 Id. at 442.  
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The decision of whether to recognize a cultural defense also touches 
upon the issue of equality before the law.  Opponents of cultural defense 
argue that the cultural defense will lead to the special treatment of 
immigrant and minority groups and to discrimination against members of 
the dominant group who are not entitled to such a defense.17  Supporters of 
the cultural defense criticize this position and claim that members of the 
dominant group do not need a cultural defense since the law already 
embodies their cultural values.18  They argue not only that the cultural 
defense does not violate the equality principle, but that it actually promotes 
equality, since the admittance of cultural arguments in court ensures that 
minority or immigrant defendants are afforded the same protection enjoyed 
by members of the dominant group—the evaluation of their behavior 
according to their cultural code.19  In other words, the equality principle is 
violated not by presentation of cultural defense claims, but by lack of 
consideration of cultural diffrences in cultural conflict cases.  
While discussing the cultural defense in the context of equality, one 
must also consider the obligation of the state to provide equal protection 
from criminal conduct for all members of society regardless of their group 
affiliation.  This brings us to one of the central arguments against cultural 
defense: the cultural defense has been criticized for violating women’s and 
children’s rights.  Feminists have raised the concern that the acceptance of 
cultural claims will be understood as forgiveness and condonation of 
practices that subordinate women and violate their rights and will 
undermine the deterrent effect of law in  those cases.20 
This feminist position against cultural defense, however, has been 
criticized from inside the feminist movement itself, by women of color 
feminists.  Women of color feminists criticize Western or white feminists 
for not recognizing the fact that women of color are not only suffering from 
gender oppression but also from racial and cultural oppression.  They 
criticize white feminists’ perceptions of minorities’ cultures as being merely 
sources of oppression, the resulting position that the cultural defense should 
not be recognized, and the implication that minority women should give up 
 
17 See Coleman, supra note 13, at 1141-44. 
18 See Daina C. Chiu, Note, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation and 
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1097 (1994). 
19 James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and 
Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1879-80 (1999); Michael Winkelman, 
Cultural Factors in Criminal Defense Proceedings, 55 HUM. ORG. 154, 155 (1996). 
20 See Alice J. Gallin, The Cultural Defense: Understanding the Policies Against 
Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723, 743-44 (1994); Okin, supra note 7, at 18-20. 
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their culture.21  A good example of the difference between white feminist 
perceptions of cultural defense and those of women of color is the reaction 
to People v. Chen.22  Chen was an immigrant to the United States from 
China who killed his unfaithful wife.  The court accepted the cultural 
defense claim that Chen acted because of cultural pressures.23  Following 
the decision in Chen, the National Organization of Women filed a 
complaint against the judge.24  Organizations of Asian women that initially 
joined the complaint later withdrew, fearing that the cultural defense option 
would be lost altogether thus leaving minorities unable to use it in other 
contexts.25  One group’s representative explained, “[T]o bar the use of 
cultural defense promotes the idea that when people come to America they 
have to give up their way of doing things.  This is a notion that we can not 
support.”26 
To summarize, the idea of cultural defense lies not only in cultural 
sensitivity but to a large extent in individual justice.  This means that those 
who do not agree with multicultural ideas can still support cultural defense.  
On the other hand, as explained above, multicultural scholars will not 
necessarily support the cultural defense notion.  How one reacts to cultural 
conflict cases is complicated by the need to find the right balance between 
conflicting values (such as individual justice versus women’s rights) and 
choose between different interpretations of legal principles (such as the 
equality principle).  The decisions of criminal courts in cultural conflict 
cases and the considerations underlying those decisions are therefore far 
from obvious.  The following Section reviews what is known about judicial 
decisions in cultural conflict criminal cases. 
B.  THE LITTLE WE KNOW ABOUT JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CULTURAL 
CONFLICT CASES 
The literature has focused on the question of whether there should be a 
cultural defense and examined the different possibilities for raising cultural 
 
21 Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1576-88 (1996); Leti Volpp, Note, 
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense”, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 57, 80-83 (1994).  
22 People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 2, 1988).  
23 Id. 
24 Paul J. Magnarella, Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: The Cultural Defense 
on Trial, 19 J. ETHNIC STUD. 65, 74 (1991); Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 21, 
at 77. 
25 Magnarella, supra note 24, at 74; Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 21, at 
77. 
26 Magnarella, supra note 24, at 74. 
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evidence in court.27  Little is known, however, about the actual reactions of 
courts in cultural conflict cases, as there is no empirical research based on a 
sample of judicial decisions in such cases. 
The literature reports instances in which cultural evidence mitigated 
defendants’ liability and sentences, but the success rate of this defense 
strategy has not been clear to date.  Some authors have argued that courts 
have been reluctant to admit cultural evidence,28 while others have claimed 
that cultural evidence has been used successfully to reduce charges and 
sentences.29 
This literature on cultural defense is mostly based on examples of 
cases and not on an empirical examination of samples of cultural conflict 
cases.  Specifically, writers have presented examples to illustrate their 
claims,30 analyzed one or two cases,31 reviewed recent cases,32 or presented 
cases in which they took part.33  In fact, the primary source of data for most 
of the cultural defense literature is the same three high-profile criminal 
cases: People v. Kimura,34 People v. Moua,35 and People v. Chen.36,37 
 
27 E.g., RENTELN, supra note 6; Coleman, supra note 13, at 1093-167; Kay L. Levin, 
Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural 
Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 39-86 (2003); Renteln, supra note 3; Volpp, 
(Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 21; Note, supra note 3. 
28 E.g., Valerie L. Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On the Misuses of Culture in 
Criminal Law, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 523, 532 (1996); Renteln, supra note 3, at 501. 
29 E.g., Sing, supra note 19, at 1848; Gallin, supra note 20, at 724. 
30 E.g., LEON SHELEFF, THE FUTURE OF TRADITION: CUSTOMARY LAW, COMMON LAW AND 
LEGAL PLURALISM (2000); Gallin, supra note 20, at 723-45; Magnarella, supra note 24, at 
65-84; Charmaine M. Wong, Note, Good Intentions, Troublesome Applications: The 
Cultural Defense and Other Uses of Cultural Evidence in Canada, 42 CRIM. L. Q 367, 367-
96 (1999). 
31 E.g., Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition, 
Accommodation, and American Law, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 285-316 (1994); Sing, 
supra note 19, at 1845-84; Volpp, (Mis) Identifying Culture, supra note 21, at 57-102; Nancy 
A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Karagar and the Existing 
Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 873 (1999); Deborah Woo, The 
People v. Fumiko Kimura: But Which People?, 17 INT’L J. SOC. LAW 403, 403-28 (1989). 
32 E.g., Maguigan, supra note 2, at 36-99; Sacks, supra note 28, at 523; Taryn F. 
Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflict in Court: Should the American Criminal Justice 
System Formally Recognize a Cultural Defense?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141, 141-68 (1994). 
33 Winkelman, supra note 19, at 154. 
34 Record of Court Proceedings, People v. Kimura, No. A-09113 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 
Nov. 21, 1985). 
35 Record of Court Proceedings, People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Super. Ct. Fresno 
County Feb. 7, 1985). 
36 People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 2, 1988). 
37 Randall R. Berger & Jeremy Hein, Immigrants, Culture, and American Courts: A 
Typology of Legal Strategies and Issues in Cases Involving Vietnamese and Hmong 
Litigants, 26 CRIM. JUST. REV. 38, 40-41 (2001). 
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Some studies presented more systematic research on cultural defense.  
Those studies have dealt with the issue of raising cultural arguments in 
criminal courts, but none has directly addressed the issue of judicial 
reactions to cultural arguments.  For instance, Renteln has reviewed a large 
number of cultural defense criminal and civil cases in order to examine the 
nature of the debate surrounding the admissibility of cultural evidence.38  
Her study, however, was not based on a scientific sampling of the cases, nor 
did it systematically examine the judicial decisions in those cases.  
Likewise, while Beger and Hein’s study of American criminal and civil 
cases involving Vietnamese and Hmong defendants is based on a sample of 
cases, it portrays the legal strategies and issues related to raising cultural 
arguments in court and not the judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases.39  
Similarly, Winter reviewed the history of female circumcision trials in 
France.40  She did not focus, however, on the judicial decisions in those 
cases but instead explored the debate surrounding the issue of female 
circumcision.41 
In short, the issue of criminal courts’ reactions to cultural conflict 
cases has not yet been adequately examined empirically.  This Article 
attempts to fill that gap in the literature by providing an empirical 
examination of judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases and of the factors 
affecting those decisions. 
C.  DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES FOR ADDRESSING CULTURAL CONFLICT 
CASES 
The literature and public debates have mainly focused on whether 
cultural defense arguments should be accepted or rejected as a consideration 
in decisions about guilt and punishment.  This focus has ignored the the 
possibility of “cultural offense,” namely the use of cultural background 
against a defendant.  This Section starts with a short review of the existing 
legal possibilities for considering cultural background in mitigation before 
turning to the less acknowledged possibility of cultural background being 
used offensively against the accused. 
To date, no state has recognized the cultural defense as a formal 
defense in the general part of its criminal law, though this possibility has 
been raised by officials.  For instance, the Canadian Department of Justice 
suggested adding a cultural defense to the general part of its criminal law in 
 
38 RENTELN, supra note 6. 
39 Berger & Hein, supra note 37, at 38-41. 
40 Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law, and Cultural Relativism in France: The Case of 
Excision, 19 SIGNS 939 (1994). 
41 Id. 
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1994.42  It was suggested that a “person would be found not guilty for 
conduct that would otherwise be criminal when the person acted in 
accordance with his or her customs of beliefs.”43  However, the idea was 
rejected due to public outcry and concerns within the House of Commons.44  
In Israel in 2008, an Ethiopian member of the Knesset proposed a bill for 
cultural defense that read: “If a member of a national-ethnic group has been 
convicted of felony behavior that is common and acceptable to his/her 
cultural group, the court may consider cultural background as a mitigating 
circumstance in the decision on punishment.”45  The proposed bill did not 
come even to a preliminary vote in the Knesset.  Despite attempts in 
different states to formally recognize cultural defenses, no Western state has 
yet recognized cultural defense as a formal defense. 
Cultural arguments, therefore, are raised through existing defenses (for 
example, provocation, necessity, duress, and self-defense) in order to negate 
or mitigate the criminal liability of the accused.46  An example of this is 
found in the Californian rape case People v. Moua,47 in which cultural 
evidence was introduced as part of a mistake-of-fact defense.  Specifically, 
the defense argued that the defendant, a Hmong man from Laos, lacked the 
intent necessary for a rape conviction since the cultural practice of 
marriage-by-capture led him to mistakenly believe that the victim consented 
to the sexual act.48  According to the cultural practice of marriage-by-
capture, a woman must protest against the sexual act as an indication of her 
virtue, and the man is supposed to continue the sexual act despite the 
woman’s protest to show that he is worthy of being her husband.49  The 
judge in Moua accepted the argument that the accused genuinely believed 
that the victim consented, reduced the charges against the accused from 
rape and kidnapping to false imprisonment, and gave the defendant a lighter 
sentence.50 
 
42 CANADA DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REFORMING THE GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL CODE: A 
CONSULTATION PAPER 23 (1995). 
43 Id. at 23.  
44 Wong, supra note 30, at 367-68. 
45 Cultural Defense, Draft bill amending the Penal Code, (no. 3728), 2008, HH, 1, 
available at www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/17/3728.rtf.  
46 E.g., Renteln, supra note 3, at 445-87; Note, supra note 3, at 1294.  For review of 
ways in which cultural evidence can be incorporated into pre-existing defenses, see Renteln, 
supra note 3, at 445-87. 
47 Record of Court Proceedings, People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Super. Ct. Fresno 
County Feb. 7, 1985). 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.; see also RENTELN, supra note 6, at 126-27; Gallin, supra note 20, at 728-29; 
Maguigan, supra note 2, at 64. 
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Cultural arguments can also be raised as mitigating circumstances at 
the sentencing stage.  It is possible to raise cultural arguments as part of the 
consideration for punishment due to the large discretion that judges have at 
the penalty stage.51  The idea is that the defendant whose acts are culturally 
motivated is less blameworthy and therefore deserves a lesser punishment.52 
While the literature and public debate have mainly focused on cultural 
defense, there is also the possibility that cultural background will be used 
offensively against the accused.  While the literature has rarely referred to 
the possibility (which I refer to as cultural offense),53 it is reasonable to 
expect this judicial decision pattern for two reasons.  First, the existing legal 
framework allows cultural evidence to be considered offensively against the 
accused in three ways: (1) as an indication of an offense element (for 
example, the custom of protecting family honor can be used to indicate 
intent in murder cases); (2) as a reason to reject a defense argument (for 
example, an insanity defense may be rejected where evidence shows that 
the defendant’s actions are considered normal in his or her cultural group); 
and (3) as a consideration for inflicting harsher punishment (for example, 
imposing a more severe punishment in order to eliminate the cultural 
norm). 
Second, there is some evidence in the literature that prosecuting 
attorneys have used cultural evidence offensively.  Berger and Hein found 2 
criminal cases, out of 181 criminal and civil cases, in which cultural 
evidence was used offensively by the prosecution or by an expert witness 
for the state.54  Likewise, Roberts has identified cases in which cultural 
evidence was used against black defendants.55 
It seems that there are three possible judicial reactions to cultural 
conflict cases: accepting cultural defense arguments, rejecting cultural 
defense arguments, and considering cultural background offensively against 
the accused.  The research hypothesis guiding this Article is that judges will 
tend not to consider cultural background as mitigation but will instead reject 
cultural defense arguments or even consider cultural background 
offensively.  This hypothesis is based on the theoretical frameworks of the 
conflict perspective.56 
 
51 Note, supra note 3, at 1295. 
52 RENTELN, supra note 6, at 187-92; Renteln, supra note 3, at 441-45. 
53 For exceptions, see Berger & Hein, supra note 37, at 53-54; Dorothy E. Roberts, Why 
Culture Matters to Law: The Difference Politics Makes, in CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY 
POLITICS, AND THE LAW 97 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).  
54 Berger & Hein, supra note 37, at 53-54. 
55 Roberts, supra note 53, at 97. 
56 The conflict perspective was chosen as the theoretical framework to address that 
phenomenon of cultural conflict cases, since it is based on the premise that there is no 
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According to the conflict perspective, law enforcement is steeped in 
the conflict and power differentials among social, economic, and political 
interest groups in society.  One claim that arises from this perspective is 
that the criminal justice system embodies the interests of the powerful 
groups in society and controls subordinated groups who threaten the 
dominant groups’ interests.57  It is expected, therefore, that court decisions 
in cultural conflict cases will protect the culture of the dominant groups.  
The protection of the dominant culture preserves not only that culture but 
has implications for the social status of groups within the society.  In 
heterogeneous societies, the acts of defining certain behavior as moral and 
certain behavior as violating that morality are political.  Court decisions that 
glorify the values of one group while demeaning those of another are acts of 
support of one cultural group as they enhance the social status of the groups 
carrying the affirmed cultural values and degrade other groups in the 
society, which are are labeled as deviant.58 
Based on the conflict perspective, it is expected that courts’ attitudes 
toward cultural differences in cultural conflict cases will be negative.  
Namely, judges will tend to reject cultural defense arguments and may 
consider cultural background offensively. 
D.  FACTORS AFFECTING JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CULTURAL 
CONFLICT CASES 
No empirical research on the factors affecting judicial decisions in 
cultural conflict cases has been conducted.  However, the literature presents 
some predictions about the circumstances in which a cultural defense will 
be accepted.  A review of those predictions led to the following four 
plausible circumstances for acceptance of cultural defense.  First, judges 
will tend to be more sensitive to cultural differences at the trial court level 
 
agreement between groups in society on the norms and values embodied in the criminal law.  
The alternative perspective—the structural functionalism perspective—seemed less 
appropriate, as it assumes the existence of social consensus and does not deal with conflict in 
society.  GEORGE RITZER & DOUGLAS J. GOODMAN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 112 (6th ed. 
2004).  A perspective that assumes a social consensus on the norms and values is a less 
suitable framework for understanding the phenomena of cultural conflict cases—cases that 
are in essence about conflict between groups on the norms, values, and worldviews 
underlying the criminal law.  Nevertheless, the possibility of explaining judicial reactions to 
cultural conflict cases using the alternative perspective—the structural functionalism 
perspective—was examined.  See infra note 151. 
57 E.g., WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER (1982); 
RICHARD QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME (1970); AUSTIN T. TURK, CRIMINALITY 
AND LEGAL ORDER (1969). 
58 Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of 
Deviance, 15 SOC. PROBS. 175, 178 (1967). 
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than at the appellate level.59  Second, cultural defense arguments are more 
likely to be accepted when there is no expectation that the minority group in 
question has yet had the opportunity to absorb the conduct norms of the 
dominant group, as in cases of new immigrants60 or when the cultural 
practice is being handled by the court for the first time.61  Third, cultural 
defense arguments will be accepted when a minority group is presented as 
an inferior one, for example, when the defense argument is presented along 
the lines of “these poor illiterate Africans don’t know any better.”62  Fourth, 
cultural defense arguments will be accepted in cultural similarity cases in 
which the actions of the defendant are perceived as not departing 
substantially from the dominant cultural behavior.63 
The three latter circumstances are similar in that they are all 
circumstances in which there is little threat to the dominate groups’ status.  
For example, when a cultural defense is accepted due to perceived cultural 
similarity, the cultural argument is treated favorably because of its 
resemblance to dominant cultural norms and not out of respect for cultural 
differences.64  Acceptance of a cultural difference by domesticating it to fit 
prevailing cultural assumptions maintains domination, since the difference 
disappears and, with it, the perceived threat posed by that difference to 
social stability.65 
Likewise, when the minority group is presented as inferior, the 
acceptance of a cultural defense does not threaten the status of the dominant 
groups since the dominant culture is presented as superior.  Acceptance of 
cultural arguments when minority groups have not had the opportunity to 
adopt the conduct norms of the dominant groups also does not threaten the 
dominant groups’ status.  This is because the acceptance of cultural 
arguments in those cases reflects forgiveness rather than recognition of 
 
59 SHELEFF, supra note 30, at 269.  The reason for this claim is that trial court judges 
have direct contact with the defendant and, therefore, can perceive his or her belief, whereas 
in appellate hearings the court tends to focus on the theoretical issues involved, conscious of 
its role in creating precedents and future norms.  Id. at 269-70. 
60 Magnarella, supra note 24, at 68; Roberts, supra note 53, at 98. 
61 Renteln, supra note 3, at 484. 
62 Winter, supra note 40, at 948. 
63 Chiu, supra note 18, at 1113-20; Roberts, supra note 53, at 98; Sing, supra note 19, at 
1877.  For instance, in the well-known case of People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991), which involved parent-child suicide, the judges allowed cultural evidence to be 
introduced as a mitigating circumstance because the accused was presented as a self-
sacrificing mother.  Id. at 887 (allowing instruction which told the jury that “it may consider 
evidence of defendant's cultural background in determining the existence or nonexistence of 
the relevant mental states”). 
64 Chiu, supra note 18, at 1113-20; Sing, supra note 19, at 1877. 
65 Chiu, supra note 18, at 1113-20; Roberts, supra note 53, at 99; Sarat & Berkowitz, 
supra note 31, at 290. 
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cultural diversity—it is expected that, over time, minorities will assimilate 
into the dominant culture, and hence, the dominant culture will continue to 
be the standard for proper behavior.66 
Based on this analysis and on the conflict perspective, it is expected 
that a central reason for courts’ negative reactions to cultural differences is 
the need to protect the interests of the dominant groups in society.  There 
are, however, other possible explanations for a decision to reject cultural 
defense arguments or to consider cultural background offensively.  For 
instance, a judge may reject the cultural defense due to a lack of legal tools 
necessary to consider the cultural evidence or regard the cultural 
background as a consideration for severe punishment in order to protect 
human rights.  This Article examines those and other explanations for 
courts’ negative reactions to cultural differences.  
II.  METHODOLOGY 
This Article examines courts’ reactions to cultural conflict cases in the 
context of the Israeli judicial system.  Israel is a culturally heterogeneous 
society with a number of different ethnic and religious groups, thus making 
it a good research field to study courts’ reactions to cultural conflict cases.  
The dominant groups in Israeli society are Jews, Ashkenazim (Jews from 
European or North American origins), and Secular Jews.  This Article 
examines judges’ attitudes in cultural conflict cases involving defendants 
from the three main minority cultural groups in Israel: Arabs (including 
Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins), Mizrachim (Jews of Middle 
Eastern, North African, or Balkan origins), and Religious Jews.67 
The research examines the Israeli criminal court system.  The findings 
presented are likely to have relevance to other Western legal systems.  
Israeli criminal justice institutions, criminal law, and court procedure are 
based on British law.  In fact, the British Mandate criminal code was the 
Israeli criminal code until 1977 and the basis for the criminal code after 
1977.68  The principles informing the Israeli criminal justice system are 
similar to those informing Anglo-American legal systems.69  One 
 
66 Roberts claims, likewise, that courts may be more willing to consider cultural defense 
in cases involving Asian defendants, as they see Asians as a model of minorities who have 
successfully emulated American values.  Hence, the cultural argument was accepted because 
this immigrant group was perceived as one that adopted the dominant culture and did not, 
therefore, pose a threat to the dominant group.  Roberts, supra note 53, at 96. 
67 The research examined cases of new immigrants, of immigrants that have resided in 
Israel for quite some time, and of persons born in Israel. 
68 YORAM RABIN & YANIV VAKI, DINE ONASHIM [PENAL LAW] 6-9 (2008). 
69 Arye Rattner & Gideon Fishman, JUSTICE FOR ALL? JEWS AND ARABS IN THE ISRAELI 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (1998). 
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significant difference bears mentioning: all Israeli court cases are tried by 
professional judges and not by juries. 
The avenues available for raising cultural arguments in Israeli criminal 
courts are similar to those available in other Western criminal courts.  Like 
legal systems elsewhere, the Israeli legal system does not officially 
recognize a separate cultural defense, but it is possible to make cultural 
arguments through the existing criminal code, using traditional defense 
arguments (for example, self-defense and provocation), through the 
“reasonable person” test, and as a consideration in punishment, an area in 
which Israeli judges have broad discretion.  In the context of the Israeli 
criminal code, however, it should be noted that the Israeli criminal code’s 
definition of “self defense” and “necessity” included “protection of honor” 
until 1992.70  Those defenses, therefore, could have been used in cultural 
conflict cases involving honor protection (for example, family honor 
killing). 
The data for this Article come from published cases of the Supreme 
Court of Israel and district courts.71  Relying on published cases is a 
common practice in research on judicial decisions.72  Reliance on published 
cases may lead to a selection bias due to possible differences between 
published and unpublished cases.  In fact, research has shown that there is a 
difference between published and unpublished rulings in some aspects, 
including verdict length and appellant success rates.73  The existence of 
differences between published and unpublished cases does not mean, 
 
70 SANGERO BOAZ, HAGANA ATZMIT BAMISHPAT HAPLILI [SELF-DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL 
LAW] 153-54 (2000).  
71 The Israeli criminal judicial system is composed of three courts: magistrate courts, 
district courts, and the Supreme Court.  The magistrate courts exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over offenses punished by fine or no more than seven years imprisonment.  The district 
courts exercise criminal jurisdiction in all criminal cases beyond the jurisdiction of 
magistrate courts and serve as appellate court for magistrate court decisions.  The Supreme 
Court exercises jurisdiction over the district courts’ decisions and serves as the state’s High 
Court of Justice.  This research did not examine decisions of magistrate courts for practical 
reasons.  Rulings of magistrate courts are kept for only fifteen years and have only been 
published since the 1980s, so no information is available on the rulings of these courts for 
considerable part of the period examined in the research (1948-2001). 
72 Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A 
Comparison of Publication of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1153 (1990); Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the 
United States District Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 
J. POL. 206 (1988). 
73 See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins, Data Collection in Comparative Judicial Research: A 
Note on the Effects of Case Publication upon Theory Building and Hypothesis Testing, 45 
POL. RES. Q. 783, 785-90 (1992); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 72, at 1150-56. 
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however, that one cannot rely on published cases alone; rather the 
researcher must consider the possibility of selection bias.74 
The main concern in this study is that the published cases may reflect 
only what the legal system is willing to expose.  Based on interviews with 
judges charged with the selection of cases for publication, it seems that this 
is not a significant concern.  The judges charged with the task of selecting 
cases for publication said that the main selection criteria are whether the 
verdict is innovative, deals with important legal notions, or aggregates the 
legal material in the field.  They have stated that the selected cases reflect a 
variety of judicial opinions and that improper expressions by the judges are 
not a consideration against publication. 
Published cases might, however, be more focused on certain kinds of 
offenses or on certain kinds of legal claims.75  One should not draw 
conclusions based on the current research about the types of offenses in 
which a cultural conflict occurs, or on the kind of legal claims (such as 
provocation or self defense) used to introduce cultural arguments.  
Whereas legal issues (including offense types and the nature of defense 
claims) are criteria for publication, the way courts deal with cultural 
differences is not a factor in the selection of cases for publication.  For the 
majority  of the cultural conflict cases examined in this research (70%), the 
cultural issue was not mentioned at all in the index of published cases.  It is 
also questionable whether the rest of the cases in which cultural issues were 
mentioned in the case description (30%) were selected for the cultural issue.  
This is because of the lack of any “cultural” keyword in the verdict index 
and the fact that cultural differences are not regarded as a central issue by 
legal practitioners (for example, there are hardly any legal textbooks 
discussing this issue).  It seems, therefore, that most cases were chosen for 
publication for reasons other than the existence of a cultural conflict issue.  
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the risk of selection bias is low in this 
regard.  
Over fifty years of judicial decisions in cultural cases were reviewed 
for this Article.  Each one of the Israeli district court and Supreme Court 
published criminal judicial decisions between 1948, when the state of Israel 
was founded, and 2001—nearly five thousand criminal cases—was 
reviewed in order to identify all cultural conflict cases.76  Cases were 
selected for examination when the criminal act in the case was committed 
 
74 Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 72, at 1165-66. 
75 Id. at 1153-54. 
76 A decision was made to go through all criminal cases in the relevant period, since 
there is no legal index that identifies cultural conflict cases, and because using keywords, 
such as “culture,” “custom,” and different cultural practice names in computer database 
searches would not pull up all cultural conflict cases. 
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because of the defendant's different cultural background and where culture 
was relevant to determination of guilt or punishment.77  In order to 
understand judges’ attitudes toward cultural conflict cases, the study 
examined all cultural conflict criminal cases and not just cases in which 
cultural defense arguments were made. 
The definition of “cultural conflict case” is, however, problematic.  
The vast majority of the articles on cultural defense do not define what a 
“cultural background crime” is.  In an attempt to present some structure to 
the debate on cultural defense, Van Broeck has defined a “culturally 
motivated crime” as “an act by a member of a minority culture, which is 
considered an offense by the legal system of the dominant culture.  That 
same act is nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender, 
condoned, accepted as normal behaviour and approved or even endorsed 
and promoted in the given situation.” 78 
This definition does not provide a workable conception of cultural 
offenses because of the complexity of defining “culture.”  There are many 
definitions of the term “culture,” and hence, different scholars refer to 
different things when they refer to “culture.”79  Culture is a difficult concept 
to define because it has no clear geographic, national, or ethnic 
boundaries,80 a person can belong to a number of cultural groups 
simultaneously,81 and cultures are constantly changing over time and not 
monolithic—different parts of the same cultural group may define their 
culture differently (for example, there might be differences in cultural 
perceptions between religious and secular members of the same cultural 
group).  Moreover, the definitions of ethnic groups and their cultural 
characteristics are socially constructed and subject to different meanings 
according to political and economic needs.82  The emphasis or elimination 
 
77 Cultural background is relevant not only for the determination of guilt or punishment.  
Cultural background can also be raised, for instance, in plea bargaining or pretrial 
negotiations.  Chiu, supra note 18, at 1295; Magnarella, supra note 24, at 75. 
78 Jeroen Van Broeck, Cultural Defense and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural 
Offenses), 9 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 1, 5 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
79 JOHN R. HALL ET AL., SOCIOLOGY ON CULTURE 6 (2003). 
80 CHRIS BAKER, MAKING SENSE OF CULTURAL STUDIES: CENTRAL PROBLEMS AND 
CRITICAL DEBATES 72-77 (2002). 
81 Yehouda Shenhav & Hanan Hever, The Postcolonial Gaze, 20 THEORY & CRITICISM 9, 
15-16 (2002). 
82 E.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); Fredrik Barth, 
Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES 32-37 (Fredrik Barth ed. 1969). 
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of a certain cultural characteristic of a group can be done by the group 
itself,83 other groups in society, or the state.84 
For the purposes of this research, it has been decided to avoid an a 
priori definition of “cultural behavior”; instead, cultural behavior is 
identified as such where it has been presented as cultural behavior before 
the court,85 regardless of who made the definition—the judge (who often 
belonged to a dominant group),86 the defendant (who was a member of a 
minority group), the prosecution, defense counsel, or a professional 
witness—as long as the judge was aware of the cultural issue.  The 
emphasis on judge’s awareness was motivated by the primary research goal 
of examining judges’ reactions to cases in which the defendant acted 
according to his or her culture.  Therefore, cases were included only where 
there was an indication in the verdict that the judge was aware of the 
cultural dimension of the offense.87 
A case was selected if it fit one of the following three criteria, which 
indicate the judges’ awareness of the cultural background.  First, a case was 
selected if it was stated in the verdict that the act was committed by a 
minority group member due to his or her cultural or religious background 
(for example, if the verdict contained references to “Muslims customs” or 
included language such as “in the defendant’s sector it is considered 
provocation”).  Second, a case was included if the name of the cultural 
 
83 E.g., GEERTZ, supra note 82, ch.10; Fredrik Barth, Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS 
AND BOUNDARIES, supra note 82, at 32-37. 
84 KAREN L. PLISKIN,  SILENT BOUNDARIES: CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON SICKNESS AND 
DIAGNOSIS OF IRANIANS IN ISRAEL (1987); Longina Jakubowska, Resisting Ethnicity: The 
Israeli State and Bedouin Identity, in THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND TERROR 
85 (Carolyn Nordstrom & JoAnn Martin eds., 1992); Steven Kaplan & Chaim Rosen, 
Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: Preservation of Culture and Invention of Tradition, 1993 
JEWISH J. SOC. 35, 35-37 (1993). 
85 “Cultural behavior” in this research means behavior that is considered a proper one in 
the relevant culture—not a behavior that is common but is not considered a proper cultural 
value (for example, tax evasion).  This is because a conflict between the culture of a minority 
group and the law of the state exists only for cases in which the minority group viewed a 
behavior—or the values that lead to such behavior—as proper. 
86 Israeli judges are most often Jews, Ashkenazim, and Secular.  For instance, only 15% 
of all the Supreme Court judges were Mizrachim, and 13% were religious Jews.  Birnhack, 
Michael Dan & David Gussarsky, Kisaot Ihudiim, Deot Miut u Pluralizm Shiputi 
[Designated Seats, Dissenting Opinions and Judicial Pluralism], 22 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 
499, 505 (1999).  The first Arab judge was appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court in 1999 as 
a temporary appointment.  An Arab judge was appointed to a permanent appointment in 
2004. 
87 Selection criteria did not include the authenticity of the cultural claim, because, among 
other things, this research examines judges’ reactions to the cultural claims presented to 
them, for example, whether rejections of cultural defense arguments were based on the 
determination of reliability of cultural claims presented to the court. 
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practice was mentioned in the verdict and it was clear that an Israeli judge 
would know that a cultural practice was involved (for example, family 
honor murder or blood revenge).  If the practice at issue was not necessarily 
cultural, as in the case of bigamy, for example, the case was not selected 
unless the first selection criterion was met.  Third, cases were included if it 
was absolutely clear from the description of the case that the judge was 
aware of the cultural issue involved.  It was assumed in those cases that the 
judge did not mention the practice by name or state that it was the custom 
because it was so obvious that the judge did not feel there was a need to 
mention it.  The cases in this category are mainly cases of family honor 
murder in which a statements like “the accused killed his sister because of 
the shame her pregnancy has brought on the family” were sufficient to 
determine that an Israeli judge was aware of the cultural issue.  When it 
could not be determined from the verdict that the judge was aware that a 
cultural issue was involved, the full case protocol was examined. 
After identifying the cultural conflict cases, the complete files of the 
cases were retrieved from the courts’ archives.  Those files were reviewed 
in order to gain additional information about the case and the material 
presented to the court.88 
Choosing only those cases in which the judge’s awareness of the 
cultural issue was indicated was necessary for assessing judicial attitudes 
toward cultural issues.89  The cases, however, do not necessarily represent 
all the existing cultural conflict cases as there is evidence of cultural cases 
in which judges did not mention the cultural issue in the verdict despite 
being aware of it in the course of the trial.90  For that reason, one should not 
attempt to ascertain the actual percentage of cultural conflict cases in Israel 
based on this research, nor the types of crimes that involve a cultural 
background.   
The cultural conflict cases were analyzed by combining qualitative and 
quantitative research methods.91  The quantitative analysis was based on 
 
88 The archive files include verdicts given by all court levels, indictment, testimonies 
given in police interviews, reasons for appeal, and the protocol of the court in which the 
testimonies have been heard.  The files do not normally include the protocol of the 
proceedings in the Supreme Court.  A study of the files was possible for most—but not all—
the cases in the research, since not all the file types are kept indefinitely. 
89 Not mentioning the cultural issue involved is, of course, a type of judicial reaction.  
However, since it was not feasible to systematically gather these cases, they were not 
included in the research. 
90 Cases for which the cultural background was not mentioned at the verdict stage were 
randomly discovered during a cultural background case search. 
91 Judges were not interviewed for this research—except regarding the criteria for 
publication of verdicts.  The reason is that Israeli judges are not permitted to be interviewed.  
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in 2002, in a petition submitted by a criminology student of 
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content analysis of judicial decisions.  Content analysis enables a 
comparison of a large amount of textual data and can be used to reveal 
textual characteristics that are hard to identify through casual observation.  
In content analysis, the categories for examining the text are defined a 
priori, and the researcher examines whether these categories appear in the 
text, their frequency, the amount of emphasis given to them, the amount of 
words devoted to them, and their location in the text.92  After the categories 
are defined, a systematic accounting of the text is conducted.  The coding 
includes both content that is manifestand and content that is latent.93 
Content analysis enabled an examination of different variables in the 
current research, but it did not allow a complete picture of judicial decisions 
in cultural conflict cases to emerge.  This is because content analysis 
demands that categories for analysis be determined a priori, but it is 
impossible to determine a priori the categories for examination in the case 
of judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases, as so little is known on the 
subject. 
For this reason, a qualitative analysis was conducted using grounded 
theory.  In grounded theory, one starts with a research question, but the 
theory, the concepts, and the operation are developed during data collection.  
The data collection in grounded theory leads to the analysis, and the results 
of early analysis guide subsequent data collection; hence, the analysis is a 
spiral process.  In the course of the review of the data, the researcher looks 
for key terms, key events, or key themes in order to create categories.  After 
identifying primary concepts, the researcher looks for connections between 
them in the hope of finding a core explanatory concept.  The analysis of the 
data is done by organizing data into categories, themes, and concepts.  The 
data are presented in the form of words, ideas, and motives.  The data are 
not quantified in numbers since qualitative researchers hold the position 
that not all aspects of reality can be measured using numbers.94 
 
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, that research questionnaires are not to be presented to 
judges.  The Court reasoned that the public trust in the judicial system might be harmed by 
such action.  HCJ 2491/02 Ben Ari v. Menahel Batei Ha Mishpat [Courts Administration 
Director] [2002] Takdin (3) 9.  Judge interviews regarding the criteria for publication have 
been conducted pursuant to a special authorization by the courts’ management.  The 
authorization limited the subject of the interviews to the publication technique and not 
prohibited any discussion of judges’ considerations. 
92 WILLIAM LAWRENCE NEUMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 438-62 (2d ed. 1994). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 438-62; ANSELM L. STRAUSS & JULIET M. CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY (2d ed. 
1998).  
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Part III presents the research findings on judicial decisions in cultural 
conflict cases and the factors affecting them.  It starts, however, with a brief 
description of the cultural conflict cases examined in the research. 
III.  FINDINGS 
A.  PORTRAIT OF THE CULTURAL CONFLICT CASES95 
Out of nearly five thousand criminal cases examined, seventy cultural 
conflict cases were found.96  The majority of the cultural conflict cases in 
the research were from Supreme Court decisions (76%),97 and the rest were 
distirict court decisions.  Since most of the cases were Supreme Court 
decisions, most of the cases were appellate cases (77%), and fewer than a 
quarter (23%) of the decisions came from trial courts. 
About half (54%) of the cultural conflict cases examined involved 
severe crimes, with 12% involving misdemeanors (see Table 1).  This is 
probably not due to the characteristics of cultural conflict cases; instead, the 
explanation lies in the fact that most of the cases examined were appeals to 
the Supreme Court and that magistrate court cases were not included.  The 
small number of misdemeanor cases in this research limits the ability to 
deduce much of anything about judicial decisions in cases in which the 
offense charged carries a maximum penalty of three years or less. 
Two-thirds of the cultural conflict cases in the study involved Arab 
defendants.  The proportions of defendants who were Mizrachim or  
Religious Jews were similar (17% each).  The distribution of cases by 
ethnicity of the defendant does not reflect the distribution of the different 
ethnic groups in Israeli society.  The Arab population, for example, 
comprises only about one-fifth of the Israeli population, but Arab 
defendants make up two-thirds of the cases.  This distribution in the case 




95 This Section presents characteristics of the cases that were analyzed in this study.  As 
explained in the methodology section, those case characteristics do not necessarily reflect all 
cases with cultural background, so no conclusions should be made regarding the 
characteristics of all the cases with cultural backgrounds. 
96 The seventy cultural conflict cases located as part of the research constitute 1.5% of all 
published cases.  This percentage does not necessarily reflect the actual percentage of 
cultural conflict cases.  See supra Part II.  
97 The fact that Supreme Court cases have higher representation is not due to differences 
in the frequency with which cultural issues are raised in court but to higher publication rates 
of Supreme Court cases—a similar percentage of cultural conflict cases was found in the 
Supreme Court and district courts (1.5% and 1.3%, respectively). 
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Table 1 
Cultural Conflict Cases 
 
Offense Severity Frequency Percentage 
Severe Crime  
(15 years or more imprisonment) 
38 54% 
Crime 
(3 to 15 years imprisonment)  
24 34% 
Misdemeanors  
(3 years imprisonment or less) 
8 12% 




The cases included a variety of offenses (see Figure 1).  About half of 
the cases (51%) involved crimes resulting in the death of a victim or 




Case Distribution by Offense Type 
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frequent offense was bigamy (20%), followed by dissolution of marriage 
without wife’s consent (9%),98 not enlisting in the Israeli Defense Forces 
(6%), and other offenses, each constituting less than 5% of the cases, 
including unlawful association, assault, rape, bribery, conspiracy, and 
slander. 
The cultural conflict cases examined included a variety of different 
cultural practices including protection of family honor, bigamy, talaq 
(Muslim unilateral divorce), blood revenge, traditional healing, witchcraft, 
celebration shooting, and practices motivated by religious reasons such as 





























     
 
 
98 In Israel, dissolution of marriage without the wife’s consent is a criminal offense.  
Israeli Penal Law, 1977, § 181. 
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The variety of cultural conflict cases, in terms of ethnicity, offense 
type, and cultural practice, allows for a good picture of courts’ attitude to 
cultural conflict criminal cases. 
B.  JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CULTURAL CONFLICT CRIMINAL CASES 
The examination of judicial decisions revealed that four different 
judicial decision patterns exist in cultural conflict criminal cases.99  The first 
category is that of cultural defense, cases in which the judge considered 
cultural background to mitigate liability or reduce punishment.  For instance 
in a bigamy case involving a defendant who was a Jewish immigrant from 
Iraq, the judges considered as mitigating the fact that the defendant came 
from a country where bigamy was allowed: 
Considering all aspects of the case, the environment from which he came, its habits 
and customs, and, especially, the circumstances that led him to commit the crime and 
his current marital status, we believe that justice will be served if the punishment will 
be two instead of four months imprisonment.100 
The second category is that of rejection, cases in which judges 
explicitly stated that cultural differences are not a consideration in deciding 
guilt or punishment.  For instance, in a family honor murder case, the 
judges stated that “[e]ven though we understand that the background for the 
act is family honor, that has a special significance in this ethnic group, it is 
hard, or even impossible, for the purpose of sentencing, to take into account 
this ethnic or family custom.”101 
 
99 When examining judges’ reactions to cultural conflict situations, the focus was on 
judges’ statements on the issue and not on the outcome of the case, since the outcome of a 
case may not reflect judges’ attitudes on the subject in all situations.  For instance, this may 
be the case in a judges’ panel; or when the judge stated that he or she would have taken into 
account the cultural background, but the law does not enable him or her to consider it (for 
example, in case of  mandatory punishment); or when there are other considerations that 
affect the final decision (for example, punishment uniformity).  In those cases, categorizing 
the judicial reaction to cultural conflict according to case outcomes would have led to the 
loss of the judge’s cultural consideration statement. 
Cases in which culture had influenced the judicial decision were classified as such 
when the judges’ decision was affected by the fact that the accused held different cultural 
values, norms, or worldviews, as opposed to cases in which the cultural background was 
mentioned in relation to the judicial decision, but the cultural nature was of no importance.  
For instance, there were cases in which “family honor” was mentioned to indicate murder 
intent, but it was possible to change the motive—for example, to an inheritance dispute—
without changing the logic of the decision.  Those cases were not classified as cases in which 
culture was a consideration in the judicial decision because the cultural nature of the motive 
was of no significance. 
100 CrimA 287/58 Shlomo v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1958] IsrSC 13 197. 
101 CrimC 6/75 The State of Israel v. Abu Zaiad [1975] IsrDC 1975(2) 509. 
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The third category is that of cultural offense, cases in which the judge 
regarded the cultural background as a consideration for a more severe 
punishment, as an indication of offense elements, or as a reason to reject a 
defense claim.  For example, in Botel v. State of Israel, the court rejected 
the insanity defense since witchcraft was a common belief in the 
defendant’s cultural group, and hence, her belief in witchcraft could not be 
an indication of mental illness. 
The appellant believed at a certain stage that her husband exercised powers against 
her.  It must be noticed that superstitions, including belief in witchcraft, which are 
natural in a certain social or cultural background, seem exceptional or abnormal, in 
the quasi-medical sense of the term, in the eyes of the ordinary person who does not 
live in the atmosphere of these beliefs and delusions.  In any case, there is no reason 
to assume that a belief in demons and ghosts . . . is necessarily a sign of mental 
disease, for we know that beliefs in demons and witchcraft do exist in certain 
circles. . . .  [O]ne cannot say that the mental problems of the appellant have reached 
the stage of a substantial and actual mental illness that justifies her discharge from 
legal responsibility.102 
Cultural background was also used against the defendant in State of 
Israel v. Faares.  Faares saw his sister’s fiancé kissing his sister and asked 
him to leave the house.  The men started to argue, and Faares shot the 
fiancé.  In this case, an imam’s testimony on the cultural practice of family 
honor was one of the reasons the judge rejected the defense’s version of 
events, which included the accidental discharge of a bullet, and, instead, 
found that the evidence supported the charge of intentional murder.  Based 
on the imam’s testimony about family honor, the judge concluded that the 
defendant was motivated by his desire to protect family honor and rejected 
the defendant’s claim that he was not disturbed by the behavior of the 
couple.103 
In State of Israel v. Halevi, the defendant’s cultural background led to 
the imposition of a more severe punishment.  Here, the judge stated that a 
severe punishment was needed in order to uproot the cultural practice of 
bigamy: “the consistent ruling of this court was to impose imprisonment 
punishments in order to uproot the custom of polygamy.”104 
The fourth category was that of disregard, cases in which judges did 
not refer to the cultural issue in deciding guilt or punishment, despite their 
awareness of the defendant’s cultural background as evidenced by 
references to it in other parts of the verdict.  For example, in Amash v. 
Attorney General, a Muslim was charged with dissolution of marriage 
 
102 CrimA 228/78 Botel v. State of Israel [1976] IsrSC 31(2) 141, 148. 
103 CrimC 202/91 The State of Israel v. Faares [1991] IsrDC 1993(2) 177.  
104 CimA 392/80 The State of Israel v. Halevi [1980] IsrSC 35(2) 689, 699. 
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against his wife’s will.  When the judge described the case facts, he referred 
to the cultural background of the act: 
The  appellant is a Muslim Bedouin . . . [who] argued he could in no way continue 
living with his wife, and repeated three times the word “talaqi” (I divorce you).  
According to Sharia law, after this statement of a husband in front of a witness, the 
wife is divorced.  Hence, the Kadi approved the divorce and gave the appellant the 
verdict.105 
Though it is clear from the citation that the judge was aware of the 
cultural factors that led to the actions of the defendant, he did not refer in 
his decisions about guilt or punishment to the fact that the defendant acted 
according to his religion.  The judge did not mention cultural background as 
a consideration for mitigating liability or proving guilt, as a consideration 
for reduced or more severe punishment, nor did he note that he rejected the 
cultural background evidence—he merely ignored the cultural issue in his 
decision. 
The examination of the distribution of the four different judicial 
decision patterns found in cultural conflict cases (Figure 3) indicated that, 
in the majority of cases examined, persons violating the law by acting 
 
Figure 3 
Judicial Decisions in Cultural Conflict Cases 
 
 
     
 
according to their cultural norms, values, or beliefs were treated no 
differently than any other offender.  In about three-quarters of the examined 
 
105 CrimA 485/65 Amash v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1965] IsrSC 20(1) 378, 379.  
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cultural conflict cases (71%), judges did not consider cultural differences in 
deciding guilt or punishment, either because they decided to reject the 
cultural defense argument or because they chose to disregard it.  
Disregarding the defendant’s cultural background in deciding guilt and 
punishment was the most common judicial response—it was the response in 
half of the cases examined.  The judicial decision to reject cultural 
arguments was also found to be a frequent pattern: in one out of five of the 
cultural conflict cases examined, the cultural defense arguments were 
rejected. 
Cultural differences were considered in 29% of the cases.  When 
culture was a consideration, decisions were both in favor of the defendant 
(cultural defense cases) and against them (cultural offense cases).  Cultural 
offense cases made up almost one-fifth of the cases examined (19%,)—
almost twice the proportion of cultural defense cases (10%).  However, 
there were only twenty cases in which cultural differences were considered, 
and no significant difference was found between those two judicial 
decisions patterns.  
C. THE FACTORS AFFECTING JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CULTURAL 
CONFLICT CASES 
The previous Section demonstrated that courts’ reactions to cultural 
conflict cases were generally negative.  This Section examines the reasons 
for those negative reactions.  Based on the conflict perspective, it was 
expected that a central reason for courts’ negative reactions to cultural 
differences would be the protection of the interest of the dominant groups in 
society.  There are, however, other possible explanations, such as lack of 
legal tools and human rights considerations. 
In order to reveal the different factors that judicial decisions are 
founded on, four analyses were conducted: (1) a statistical analysis of case 
characteristics and judicial decisions; (2) a qualitative analysis of the 
circumstances in which cultural defenses were accepted; (3) a qualitative 
analysis of judicial accounts in cultural offense and rejection cases; and 
(4) qualitative analysis of the cases in which cultural background was 
disregarded. 
This Section presents the findings from the analysis of the factors that 
affected the judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases and begins with a 
presentation of the factors that did not affect the decisions in those cases. 
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1.  The Factors that Did Not Affect Decisions 
The analysis revealed a number of factors that did not significantly 
affect the judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases.106 
First, judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases were not significantly 
affected by case characterisitics, such as court level (trial or appellate), 
offense severity (see Table 2), offense type (violent or nonviolent), ethnicity 
of the defendant (see Table 3), or the victim’s gender.107 
Second, lack of recognition of the cultural conflict was also not a 
significant factor in the judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases.  Only in 
four cases did the judges claim that the cultural practice at issue did not 
exist in the defendant’s cultural group108 or that no contradiction existed 
between the law and the custom.109  The fact that the claim of lack of 
cultural conflict appeared in only four cases implies that in most cases 
judges did acknowledge the cultural conflict.  
 
 
106 Chi Square is the commonly used test for nominal level measures, but this test is 
problematic when analyzing a small number of cases.  It is considered inappropriate to use 
this test when more than one in five cells in the table have expected frequency of five or less 
DAVID WEISBURD, STATISTICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 176 (1998).  The statistical test used in 
the research, therefore, the Fisher Exact test, is not dependent on the expected value.  This 
test works similarly to Chi Square but calculates the exact probability rather than estimating 
it as is done in Chi Square. 
107 A possible explanation for not finding significance is the lack of sufficient statistical 
power, but it seems this is not the case for several reasons.  First, the percentage differences 
across different judicial decision patterns are not substantial.  Second, from the statistical 
power calculations for each of the tables, it appears that the statistical power for finding a 
large effect—a difference of 0.78 versus 0.40—was 0.88 or higher and that the statistical 
power for finding a medium effect—a difference of 0.65 versus 0.40—was 0.51 or higher 
(the calculation was done using Michael Borenstein’s “Power and Precision” software).  A 
power level of 0.80 is highly likely to evidence a significant finding and a power level 
greater than 0.50 is more likely to show a significant result than not if the null hypothesis is 
false in the population.  Id. at 287.  It seems, therefore, that the statistical power in the study 
enabled the finding of considerable differences in the judicial decision patterns. 
108 For instance, in a bigamy case, the judge wrote, “There is a big doubt, then, if and 
under which circumstances . . . Caucasus Jews were allowed to marry two wives—even 
according to the custom in the state of their origin.”  CrimA 36/50 HaYoetz HaMishpati 
LaMemshala [Attorney General] v. Yosefov [1950] IsrDC 4 457, 476. 
109 An example of a claim that no contradiction existed between law and custom is the 
case of Yosefov.  In this bigamy case, the judge rejected the defense argument that 
prohibition of polygamy contradicts freedom of conscience by claiming that 
[r]eligious coercion is possible only when a religion dictates or forbids a certain act, and the 
secular legislator forces a violation of the forbidden act.  We cannot speak of religious coercion 
regarding acts that a religion merely allows, without an absolute edict or ban, in the Jewish law, 
that oblige polygamy. 
CrimA 112/50 Yosefov v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] [1951] 
IsrSC 5(1) 481, 494. 
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Table 2 
Judicial Decisions by Offense Severity 
 
 Offense Severity 
 
Up to 15 Years 
Imprisonment* 
15 Years or More 
Imprisonment 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cultural Defense 4 13% 3 8% 
Other:  Cultural Offense, 
   Rejection, Disregard1 
28 87% 35 92% 
Total 32 100% 38 100% 
     
Cultural Offense 5 16% 8 21% 
Other:  Cultural Defense, 
   Rejection, Disregard2 
27 84% 30 89% 
Total 32 100% 38 100% 
     
Influenced Decision:  Cultural 
   Defense and Cultural Offense 
9 28% 11 29% 
Did Not Influence Decision: 
   Rejection and Disregard3 
23 72% 27 71% 
Total 32 100% 38 100% 
 
Notes: 
*  The average offense severity in this category was 7 years imprisonment.  
1.  One Tail Fisher Exact Test: P = 0.403. 
2.  One Tail Fisher Exact Test: P = 0.395. 
3.  One Tail Fisher Exact Test: P = 0.576. 
 
 
Third, legal factors are not a sufficient explanation for decisions in 
cultural conflict cases.  This assertion is based on several factors.  To begin 
with, none of judges stated that they rejected the cultural defense due to 
legal limitations.  This is despite the fact that the cultural defense is not 
officially recognized by Israeli law.  Further, cultural arguments were not 
recognized even when the law explicitly allowed for a reference to cultural 
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Table 3 
Judicial Decisions by Ethnicity of the Accused 
 
 Ethnicity of the Accused 
 Jewish Arab 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cultural Defense 2 8% 5 11% 
Other:  Cultural Offense, 
   Rejection, Disregard1 
22 92% 41 90% 
Total 24 100% 46 100% 
     
Cultural Offense 4 17% 9 20% 
Other:  Cultural Defense, 
   Rejection, Disregard2 
20 83% 37 80% 
Total 24 100% 46 100% 
     
Influenced Decision:  Cultural 
   Defense and Cultural Offense 
6 25% 14 30% 
Did Not Influence Decision: 
   Rejection and Disregard3 
18 75% 32 70% 
Total 24 100% 46 100% 
 
Notes: 
1.  One Tail Fisher Exact Test: P = 0.528. 
2.  One Tail Fisher Exact Test: P = 0.520. 
3.  One Tail Fisher Exact Test: P = 0.426. 
 
 
and “necessity” included “protection of honor,”110 yet judges did not 
recognize honor as “self-defense” or “necessity” in family honor murder 
cases.111  Moreover, the tendency among judges to disregard cultural 
background cannot be explained by the fact that attorneys failed to 
introduce cultural arguments.  In about 30% of the cases in which cultural 
background was disregarded, there was evidence that the defense attorneys 
had raised the cultural issue, and it is reasonable to assume that the true 
percentage of cases in which a cultural defense was raised is even higher.112  
 
110 BOAZ, supra note 70. 
111 See, e.g., DC (Haifa) 202/91 Israel v. Faares [1991] IsrDC 1993(2) 177. 
112 Evidence of the use of a cultural argument defense was gathered both from the verdict 
and from the archive files.  In appeals cases, the archive files include only the written appeal 
504 Tamar Tomer-Fishman [Vol. 100 
Moreover, Israeli judges are allowed to refer in their verdicts to issues they 
find relevant even if those issues were not raised by attorneys. 
In addition, judges are not bound by precedent to reject cultural 
defense arguments.  In a number of cases in which the judges rejected the 
cultural defense, they based their decision on precedent (five out of fifteen 
rejection cases).  All of those cases were murder cases in which the cultural 
issue was raised in the context of provocation.  Though provocation claims 
have rarely been accepted in Israeli court rulings,113 the rejection of the 
cultural defense in cases in which a provocation defense was raised cannot 
be explained by this tendency alone for two main reasons.  First, the Israeli 
Supreme Court is not bound by precedent and most of the cases examined 
in the research were Supreme Court rulings.  Second, in the Israeli court 
system the judges determine the characteristics of the “reasonable person,” 
and they could have chosen to shape a different “reasonable person” for 
each cultural group in society, as they do for minors and professionals.114 
The use of cultural background as an indication of the existence of 
offense elements was the choice of judges and not forced by legal 
constraints.  In a number of cases, cultural background was considered as an 
indication of offense elements (ten out of thirteen cultural offense cases).  
In these cases, it might seem that judges merely applied the law to case 
facts, but, in truth, the judges made a choice.  The judges chose to consider 
cultural information as an indication of offense elements.  In Gabara v. 
HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala, for instance, cultural background was 
used to reject the provocation defense claim.  The defendant claimed that he 
stabbed his wife after seeing her dressing subsequent to a stranger leaving 
her room: “Among us Arabs, it is a difficult thing . . . . [;] when I entered 
and saw my wife, I thought that—according to the Muslim religion—I must 
kill.”115 
The defendant’s words, meant to show the severity of his wife’s 
actions according to his culture, led the judges to reject the provocation 
claim: “I cannot find in the words I cited that the appellant lost his temper.  
 
reasoning and do not include complete protocols of the cases.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the percentage of “disregarded cases” in which a cultural argument was raised 
by the defense in the course of the appeal is even higher. 
113 Yoram Shachar, HaAdam Hassavir VeHamishpat HaPlili  [Reasonable Person and 
the Criminal Law], 39 HAPRAKLIT 78, 87-89 (1989) (Isr.). 
114 Orit Kamir, Eiech Harga Hasvirut Et Haisha: Hom Damam Shel “HaAdam 
Hassavir” Ve”Haisraelit Hametzuya” BeDoctrinat Azoalos, [Reasonableness Killed the 
Women], 6 PELILIM 137, 154 (1997) (Isr.). 
115 CrimA 230/54 Gabara v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1954] IsrSC 9(1) 925, 930. 
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It can even be concluded the contrary—that he knew well what he was 
doing and thought that it was his duty.”116 
In Gabara, the judges regarded the defendant’s cultural background as 
an indication of intent, but they could have just as well considered the 
cultural background as an indication of provocation or not considered it at 
all.  It seems, therefore, that the use of cultural background as an indication 
of offense elements is not forced by legal constraints but is a choice that 
judges make.  Judges could as easily choose to consider the cultural 
background as mitigating circumstances or not to consider it at all as they 
often did when it was relevant as mitigating circumstances. 
The high percentage of cases in which cultural background was 
disregarded also cannot be explained by cultural background not being 
relevant for the determination of guilt.  While irrelevance for guilt 
determination might explain some of the judicial responses in these cases, it 
cannot explain the the high percentage of cases in which judges disregarded 
the cultural issue since this line of reasoning appeared in only one verdict.  
Besides, even if the cultural background was not relevant for guilt 
determination, that irrelevance cannot explain why judges did not refer to 
the cultural issue at the punishment phase, where Israeli judges have wide 
discretion. 
As a final legal reason, the high percentage of cases in which cultural 
background was disregarded cannot be explained by the assumption that 
Israeli judges were not aware that it is legally possible to consider cultural 
background.  Even if we assume that the judges were not aware of the legal 
possibility of considering cultural background, this cannot explain their 
wide tendency not to refer to it in the sentencing decision where Israeli 
judges have wide discretion. 
Overall, then, it seems that legal constraints as such do not sufficiently 
explain judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases. 
A fourth factor that did not significantly affect the judicial decisions in 
cultural conflict cases was the issue of women’s rights.  The protection of 
women’s rights is one of the central issues in cultural defense literature.117  
Yet, the analysis of judicial accounts in cultural offense and rejection cases 
indicates that women’s rights were not central issues in terms of the 
frequency at which the issue was raised and the weight given to them in the 
decision.  Women’s rights were mentioned in only four cases.  This rate is 
very low, considering the number of cases in which the issue appeared 
 
116 Id. 
117 See generally Coleman, supra note 13; Gallin, supra note 20; Leti Volpp, Feminism 
Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2001); Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, 
supra note 21; Volpp, Talking “Culture”, supra note 21. 
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relevant:118 twenty family-honor murder cases, fourteen bigamy cases, six 
unilateral divorces, and two rape cases.  This lack of reference to women’s 
rights is even more striking in light of the fact that the prohibition on 
bigamy was legislated as part of the protection of Israeli women’s rights 
law.119 
The fact that the rights of women were not a central consideration is 
also apparent from the weight given to the issue in the cases.  For instance, 
in Khativ v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala, the defendant was charged 
with rape, and while the desire to protect women’s rights was mentioned in 
the verdict, it did not appear to affect the final decision.  Khativ argued in 
his defense that he raped his fiancé in order to ensure their marriage after 
her father withdrew his consent to the wedding.  The judge stated in the 
verdict that the law protects women from ethnic minority men who think it 
is acceptable to beat women.  The judge regarded this case as an 
exceptional one and considered the defendant’s cultural background as a 
mitigating circumstance in the punishment decision.  The judge stated that, 
according to their cultural customs, the couple could not have married, 
despite their mutual will, without the consent of the woman’s father and 
that the defendant acted only in order to ensure his possession of his 
fiancé.120  Hence, the fact that the victim was bitten, held against her will, 
and struggled and screamed was secondary to the defendant’s desire to 
marry and overcome the cultural limitations on this marriage.  It seems, 
therefore, that the mention of women’s rights was mainly tokenism and not 
reflective of a real concern on the part of the judge about the protection of 
women in society. 
A fifth factor not related to judicial outcomes in the cultural conflict 
cases examined was anti-discrimination principles.  Critics of cultural 
defense argue that the defense leads to special treatment of immigrant 
groups and, hence, discriminates against members of the dominant groups 
who are not entitled to such a defense.121  Cultural defense critics have also 
pointed out that government should provide equal protection from criminal 
conduct for all members of society regardless of their ethnicity.  One would 
expect, therefore, that those two issues would be among the reasons for 
 
118 This category does not include all cases in which the victim was a woman.  It includes 
the types of cultural conflict cases that are commonly regarded as involving violations of 
women’s rights: family-honor murder cases, bigamy cases, unilateral divorces, and rape 
cases. 
119 Hok Shivuy Zehuyot ha Isha [Women’s Rights Law], 1951, S.H. 248. 
120 CrimA 354/64 Khativ v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1964] IsrSC. 20(2) 136.  The author of the article used the word “possession” as it appears 
in the judicial text (hahzaka, in Hebrew).  This usage does not reflect the author’s 
perceptions in any way. 
121 Coleman, supra note 13, at 1129-35. 
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cultural defense being rejected.  The research revealed, however, that 
equality before the law was not even presented once as an argument, and 
the argument that the law should protect all citizens regardless of their 
ethnicity was mentioned in only one case.122 
In sum, the analysis indicates that case characteristics, protection of 
women’s rights, and equality before the law were not central considerations 
and that legal constraints cannot sufficiently explain judicial decisions in 
cultural conflict cases. 
2.  The Factors that Did Affect Decisions 
The research revealed a number of findings indicating that a central 
factor affecting the judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases was the 
conflict between different groups within a society. 
i.  Cultural Superiority and Protection of the Social Order 
From the qualitative analysis of judicial accounts123 of cases in which 
cultural background was used offensively or rejected, it appears that the two 
factors that drove the decisions were cultural superiority and protection of 
the social order. 
The analysis revealed that judges based their decisions on the cultural 
superiority of the dominant groups (four out of thirty-two cases in which 
cultural background was used offensively or rejected).  The fact that this 
kind of reasoning was found in cultural conflict cases is surprising from the 
judical point of view, since the question of which culture is better is not a 
legal one.  Examples of reasoning based on cultural superiority are found in 
the following quotes from two bigamy cases.  The judges wrote, 
The monogamous institution is considered—in all nations, states, and societies in 
which it exists—as one of the superior values of human culture. 124 
 
122 CrimA 7/53 Rassi v HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] [1953] 
IsrSC 7(2) 790, 796. 
123 Accounts are the way in which people organize views of themselves, of others, and of 
their social world and how they justify their decisions and behavior in front of others. The 
way people account for their behavior reflects acceptable explanation in their cultural and 
social context.  See Terri. L. Orbuch, People’s Accounts Count: The Sociology of Accounts, 
23 ANN. REV. SOC. 455 (1997).  An examination of judicial accounts enables the study of not 
only the common reasoning among judges but also the prevailing concepts in the juridical 
system. 
124 CrimA 112/50 Yosefov v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1951] IsrSC 5(1) 481, 494, translated in I SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ISRAEL 174 (1962). 
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The Israeli legislator intended to give the gift of monogamy to whom the ban never 
applied to, seeing the monogamous way of life as a higher level and a more proper 
way of life and that there is a need to raise all populations to it.125 
One expression of cultural superiority is assimilative policy.  In two 
out of thirty-two cases in which cultural background was rejected or used 
against the denfendant,126 the judges based their decisions on assimilative 
policy.  A judicial decision that is based on an assimilative argument 
reflects a perception that the culture of the dominant group is a superior one 
since, according to the assimilative approach, the requirement is that 
minority groups abandon their cultures and assimilate to the dominant 
culture, which is perceived as better.  Moreover, the concern of cultural 
superiority also appeared in all cases in which judges explained their 
decisions with melting-pot policy.  It is  reasonable to assume that behind 
the use of melting-pot reasoning stands the perception of cultural 
superiority.  
The analysis also revealed that in cultural conflict cases, judges based 
their decisions on fear of social disorder (seven out of thirty-two rejection 
and cultural offense cases).  One expression of this line of reasoning was 
the rejection of cultural arguments after describing the defendant as having 
taken “the law into his own hands.”  For instance, the judge in a blood 
revenge case wrote, “If it is decided, even once, that blood revenge is 
justified, or even can reduce murder to manslaughter, the country will be 
flooded with blood revenge and with people who take the law into their 
own hands.”127 
Viewing the defendant as a person who took the law into his own 
hands is somewhat surprising in the context of defendants who acted 
according to the cultural codes of their ethnic groups.  The judges must 
have been aware that the defendant did not take the law to his or her own 
hands but obeyed a different set of rules.  A good example of this 
contradiction is found in the following quote: 
In the Israeli courts, the following question has been raised a number of times: to what 
extent do the Arab special customs affect the criminality of an act . . . ? [T]he answer 
in all cases was the same: a person is not entitled to take the law in his own 
hands . . . .128 
If the use of the expression “took the law into his own hands” is not 
due to a misunderstanding of the cultural norms behind the act, why did the 
 
125 CrimA 596/73 Israel v. Mahamid [1973] IsrSC 28(1) 773, 776. 
126 These two case are included in the four cases of cultural superiority. 
127 CrimA 120/55 Jacob v. Israel [1955] IsrSC 9(2) 1051, 1052). 
128 CrimA 7/53 Rassi v HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] [1953] 
IsrSC 7(2) 790.  
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judges base their decisions on that?  The phrase “taking the law into his 
own hands” expresses not only a fear of law violation but also a fear of 
disorder.  What disorder does a cultural defense create?  Why is the 
acceptance of a cultural defense more disorderly than the acceptance of 
provocation, necessity, or battered woman syndrome defenses?  A cultural 
defense is regarded as chaotic since it asks to create a new order, one that 
recognizes other cultures—a social order in which the dominant culture 
loses its dominant status. 
Judges also based their decisions on the claims that cultural practices 
violate the social order and social foundations.  For instance, in a bigamy 
case, the judge wrote: 
There is no need to elaborate on the nature of the offense . . . “this offense undermines 
the proper public order in an enlightened society” . . . “monogamist marriage is one of 
the foundation of our social regime” . . . “especially the need to deter others from 
following his actions, otherwise a chaotic situation will be created regarding the 
marriage establishment in the state.”129 
The expressions the judge chose to describe the offense—“undermines the 
proper public order,” “foundation of our social regime,” “a chaotic 
situation”—sound like expressions courts would use when dealing with 
treason, with the murder of a prime minister, or another kind of challenge to 
the regime, but not with a debate over marriage patterns.  What, then, is it 
about polygamy that is so dangerous to the social order?  The answer to this 
question can be found in the following statement of a Supreme Court 
Justice in a cultural conflict bigamy case: 
I believe that for a heterogeneous population with different cultures, such as 
mandatory Israel, one can imagine that a specific law may be required for “order 
keeping” in one sector out of all the sectors in the country.  It is hard to imagine 
otherwise.  The meaning of the term “order” is not necessarily riot prevention.  It 
includes also maintaining and protecting of certain way of life and cultural values that 
that special part of the public cherishes.130 
From this quotation, it appears that the “order” that polygamy 
threatens is social order in which the values and conduct norms that are 
acceptable in the society are those of the dominant culture.131  In other 
 
129 CrimA 185/82 Goda v. Israel [1982] IsrSC 37(1) 88.  
130 CrimA 112/50 Yosefov v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1951] IsrSC 5(1) 481, translated in I SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ISRAEL 174 (1962). 
131 To analyze whether the source of the problem lies in the polygamy practice itself or in 
a cultural difference conflict, bigamy cases with no cultural background were examined.  
This examination revealed that statements regarding fear for the social order characterized 
cultural conflict bigamy cases and did not normally appear in non-cultural bigamy cases.  It 
seems, therefore, that the danger in bigamy cases does not merely lie in the marriage to a 
second wife. 
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words, the request to recognize cultural differences was not rejected 
because of the danger in the practice itself; rather, it was rejected because a 
cultural defense challenges the existing social order in which minority 
groups have to act according to dominant culture.132 
To summarize, two central considerations in cases in which cultural 
background was rejected or used offensively against the defendant were 
“cultural superiority” and “protection of social order”—both expressions of 
protection of the status of the dominant groups.    
ii.  Case Circumstances that Pose Little Threat 
The qualitative analysis of the circumstances in which a cultural 
defense was accepted indicated that judges tended to accept a cultural 
defense when the case circumstances posed little threat to the dominant 
groups. 
In the majority of cases in which a cultural defense was accepted by 
the court, the circumstances of the case posed little threat to the dominant 
group (five out of seven cultural defense cases).  For instance, cultural 
evidence was considered as mitigating in cases of cultural similarity, 
namely cases in which the defendant’s acts were not considered as 
deviating substantially from the cultural conduct norms of the dominant 
group.  For example, in Shlomo v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala, an 
Iraqi Jew immigrant charged with bigamy had appealed, with the consent of 
his first wife, to a religious court for a permission to marry a second wife 
due to his first wife’s infertility.  The religious court asked the wife to take 
some additional fertility tests, but she refused to do so, and the defendant 
married a second wife without the court’s approval.  In determining 
punishment, the judges considered the fact that the defendant came from a 
place were bigamy was allowed as a mitigating circumstance.133  An 
examination of case circumstances indicate that the defendant’s actions did 
not deviate drastically from the acceptable behavior of the dominant 
culture.  The defendant’s marriage to a second wife because of a first wife’s 
infertility conforms to the dominant Ashkenazi culture, as the approach of 
 
132 See Sarat & Berkowitz, supra note 31, for a similar explanation of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision to reject the cultural claim in the Reynolds bigamy case:  
The difference Reynolds pressed was disorderly not because it was either anarchic or savage.  It 
was disorderly precisely because it challenged a prevailing institutional practice—monogamous 
marriage—and because it did not reflect an idiosyncratic belief, but rather the “legitimate” 
practice of an entire subculture.  Rejecting polygamy was not a rejection of disorder, but was 
instead the violent gesture of one legal order against another. 
Id. at 297 (footnote omitted). 
133 CrimA 287/58 Shlomo v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1958] IsrSC 13(1) 197. 
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the majority of Ashkenazim religious judges is to allow a second wife in 
cases of infertility.134  Likewise, the fact that the defendant acted with the 
consent of his first wife fits the norms of the dominant group, as respect for 
the woman’s wishes is considered a characteristic of Western culture.135  
The defendant’s actions, then, did not dramatically deviate from the 
acceptable behavior in the dominant culture: he asked for the court’s 
permission, stated that his wife was infertile, and acted with the consent of 
his wife.  Acceptance of the cultural defense in cases presented as cultural 
symmetry, as explained above, does not threaten the dominant group for 
two reasons: first, the difference that poses a threat to dominant culture is 
eliminated; and second, the dominant culture continues to be the standard of 
proper behavior. 
Other examples of non-threatening circumstances in which a cultural 
defense was accepted involved situations in which it was understood that 
the minority group had not had enough time to absorb the conduct norms of 
the dominant group, as in the case of new immigrants or when the cultural 
practice was handled by the court for the first time.  In Al Sayaad v. Israel, 
a bigamy case, the defense claimed that the punishment inflicted by the 
lower court was too severe and that changes in bigamy punishment policy 
should be done gradually.  The defense also reminded the court of the fact 
that Islam allows polygamy and that second and higher order marriages are 
mostly done with first wife’s consent.  The judges accepted the cultural 
argument because it was the first case since the change in bigamy 
punishment policy: 
We are aware of the severity of this offense, as the legislature decided on a five-year 
maximum penalty.  Considering, however, the way of thinking and the way of life of 
the appellants and also the fact that we are, probably, dealing with the first cases of 
 
134 Elimelech Westreich, Hagant Maamad Hanisuin Shel HaIsha HaYehudia BeIsrael: 
Mifgash Bein Massorot Mishpatiot Shel HaEdot Hashonot [The Jewish Women’s Marital 
Status in Israel: Interactions Among Various Traditions], 7 PELILIM 273, 317-18 (1998) 
(Isr.).  Mizrachim Jews who marry a second wife do so based on a religious ground.  While 
Rabi Gershom Excommunication (a religious rule that forbids polygamy) is valid for 
Ashkenazi Jews, this rule does not apply for Mizrachim Jews, so marriage of more than wife 
is valid for them according to Jewish religious law. Id.  The Israeli law forbids polygamy, 
but there is an exception that applies for Jews: a second marriage is allowed if it takes place 
according to a final ruling of a religious court and the verdict is affirmed by a body 
authorized by the Chief Rabanut.  The said approval is granted in those cases not banned by 
Rabi Gershom, for example, a woman who has been infertile for ten years.  See E. 
Shuchtman, Maamad ha Isha be Dinei Nissuin ve Gerushin, in F. RADAY, K. SHALEV & M. 
VALIBAN-KOBI, MAAMAD HA ISHA BA HEVRA VE BA MISHPAT 386 (1995).   
135 It seems that the issue of the first wife’s consent was very important to the judges, as 
they have repeatedly emphasized it in their verdict.  See CrimA 287/58 Shlomo v. HaYoetz 
HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] [1958] IsrSC 13(1) 197. 
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the more severe punishment policy, we think that half of the sentence period imposed 
by the District Court will suffice.136 
From this statement it is apparent that the judges considered the 
cultural background as a mitigating circumstance, but that approach resulted 
from the fact that this case was the the first instance of a severe punishment 
being imposed since a new policy was implemented.  When a cultural 
defense is accepted in cases in which there is no expectation that minority 
groups have had the opportunity to absorb the conduct normes expected of 
them, the court does not recognize cultural diversity but merely shows some 
forgiveness.  The overall message is that, over time, minorities should 
accept the monogamous way of life.  First-instance cases, therefore, pose no 
threat to the culture of the dominant group as it continues to be the standard 
for proper behavior. 
In summary, judges tended to consider the defendant’s cultural 
background as a mitigating circumstance in cases that posed little threat to 
the dominant culture. 
iii.  Exclusion of Social and Political Issues 
The qualitative analysis of cases in which judges disregarded the 
cultural differences in the decision shows that those were decisions of 
exclusion.  Exclusion prevents discussion of social and political issues 
involved in cultural conflict cases.  The analysis indicated that in the cases 
in which judges disregarded cultural background, the judges, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, constructed the legal situation in a way that 
cultural background was irrelevant. 
The central way judges did this was by narrowly framing the relevant 
events so as to leave the cultural issue in the background story (thirty of 
thirty-five cases).  In those cases, the cultural background was presented in 
either the factual description of the case, the statement of the defendant, or 
the description of the motive, but the judges did not refer to it in their 
determination of guilt or punishment.  In Watad v. HaYoetz HaMishpati 
LaMemshala, in which the defendant committed a family-honor murder, the 
judges presented the family honor issue in the factual description of the 
case: 
[A]bout one and a half years before the incident, the deceased was suspected by the 
villagers of engaging in a sex act with her brother . . . the authorities intervened in 
order to prevent harm by her family or by other villagers and arranged for her 
relocation to the house of a dignitary at the village of Taibe.137 
 
136 CrimA 434/69-424/69 Al Sayaad v. Israel [1969] IsrSC 23(2) 823, 825.  
137 CrimA 371/62 Watad v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1962] IsrSC 16 971, 972. 
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Even though the judges mentioned the cultural background in the 
description of the case, they did not refer to it as part of the relevant facts 
for determining guilt: 
We believe that, facing the evidence, there is no doubt that the appellant planned 
ahead the killing of the deceased; that he used the invitation to visit the Nimer family; 
that the presentation of the wedding gift to the young couple was just an excuse for 
the killing that he planned; and that he came to the house where she lived with her 
husband armed with a gun for the execution of that scheme.  Those facts suffice to 
allegedly prove the elements of preparation and lack of provocation.138 
The separation of the act from the cultural background that led to it is so 
large that it is possible to change the facts of the case without changing the 
logic that led to the decision (for instance, to substitute the family honor 
motive with a financial dispute between a brother and his sister). 
The other way judges constructed the legal situation in order to make 
cultural background irrelevant was to shift the discussion away from the 
cultural issue by defining the legal issue in question in a way that the 
cultural background was not relevant to the decision (five out of thirty-five 
cases).  For instance, in Israel v. Jarbi, the defendant was charged with 
committing the pretense of witchcraft139 but claimed that he lacked the 
mental state of mind to intentionally deceive since he honestly believed in 
his powers and acted according to holy books.  The judge interpreted the 
law prohibiting pretense of witchcraft in such a way that the cultural issue 
became irrelevant to the decision—she claimed that the defendant’s belief 
that he had powers was not important for the decision: 
I believe that the mental state of mind of witchcraft pretense is embodied in the 
physical act as such, and that the “pretense” that is required for the existence of a 
witchcraft offense is derived from the specific character of the “witchcraft deed.”  In 
the case of witchcraft, pretense of witchcraft is equivalent to the deed itself.  I believe 
that demonstration of control of mystic unnatural powers can be presented only via a 
“pretense deed.”140 
In cases in which cultural background was disregarded, the judges 
constructed the legal situation in a way that cultural background was 
irrelevant by either narrowly framing the relevant events, disconnecting 
them from the cultural context, or defining the legal issues in a way that 
cultural background was irrelevant.  In other words, in these cases, judges 
chose from the various possible interpretive constructions141 the ones in 
 
138 Id. 
139 Israeli law forbids witchcraft defined as “pretending to perform an act of witchcraft 
with the intention of gain.”  Israeli Penal Law, 1977, § 417. 
140 CrimA 549/90 Israel v. Jarbi [1990] IsrDC 1992(3) 494, 519.  
141 The term “interpretive construction” refers to the conscious or unconscious process 
by which situations are reduced to substantive legal controversies.  It refers both to the way 
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which cultural background was irrelevant to the decision.  By choosing 
those interpretive constructions, judges excluded the cultural issue from the 
legal discourse.142  According to Foucault, the discourse accepted in a 
certain period and discipline determines which ideas can be heard—and 
which cannot—and therefore limits what can be said, thought, or done.143  
The choice of a certain interpretive construction impedes or even prevents 
the discussion of the political and social issues that may emerge from a 
choice of an alternative interpretive construction.144 
In the case of cultural conflict, the exclusion of the cultural issue 
prevents the discussion of the social and political issues raised by cultural 
conflict cases.  In Mansur v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala, for 
example, in which the defendant was charged with the dissolution of 
marriage without his wife’s consent, the judges focused on an examination 
of the timing the religious court’s verdict—whether it was given prior to or 
after the dissolution of the marriage by the husband.145  By concentrating on 
the timing of religious court’s approval, the cultural issue that the divorce 
was done according to Islam became irrelevant.  The way the judges 
interpreted the legal situation in this case excluded the cultural issue, so that 
they did not need to discuss the political issues involved, such as the 
existence of a competing legal system. 
The construction of the legal situation in a way that excludes the 
cultural issue prevents the need to discuss the political and cultural issues 
 
the factual situation is constructed and to the framing of the relevant rules used to handle the 
situations.  See Mark G. Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 592 (1981).  According to critical legal studies, there are a number of 
different possible interpretive constructions from which the judges may choose.  David 
Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 1-22 (David 
Kairys ed., 1982). 
142 One might claim that the judges did not refer to the cultural issue because it was 
obvious that cultural background was not a consideration.  It appears, however, that this is 
not the correct explanation for disregarded cases, as there is no general agreement in Israeli 
courts or in the legal literature about the proper reaction to cultural conflict cases.  The legal 
literature is divided on the issue: some argue that cultural background should be a 
consideration, others reject this idea, while still others claim that cultural background should 
be considered only in some circumstances.  Similarly, there seems to be no general 
agreement in Israeli courts on the reaction to cultural conflict cases since there are, as the 
current research indicates, a number of different judicial reactions in cultural conflict cases: 
cultural defense, cultural offense, and rejection. 
143 Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in UNTYING THE TEXT: A 
POSTSTRUCTURALIST READER 51-76 (Robert Young ed., 1981). 
144 Kelman, supra note 141, at 594; see also Foucault, supra note 143. 
145 CrimC 616/58 Mansur v. HaYoetz HaMishpati LaMemshala [Attorney General] 
[1985] IscDC 22 (1) 158. 
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involved in cultural conflict cases,146 such as the existence of different value 
systems, which groups in society define the criminal law, and what part the 
courts play in the oppression of minority cultures.  Hence, the exclusion of 
cultural issues from the legal discourse blocks challenges to the existing 
power relations in society.  The difference between cases in which cultural 
background was disregarded and cases in which cultural background was 
rejected or used offensively against the defendent is not one of substance—
all of them protect the status of the dominant groups in the society—but in 
the method of implementation: by explicit statements against minority 
cultures or latent exclusion of the cultural issue. 
IV.  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The empirical examination of judicial decisions in cultural conflict 
cases and the factors affecting them indicate two important issues for future 
discussion and research on cultural conflict cases.  First, it revealed that the 
judicial decision pattern is more complicated than the one presented in the 
literature—it includes, in addition to acceptance and rejection of cultural 
arguments, offensive considerations of cultural background and disregard of 
cultural background in the decision on guilt and punishment.  Second, the 
findings indicate that the tendency of courts not to consider cultural 
background in mitigation is strongly linked to power relationships between 
groups within the society and not so much to lack of sufficient legal tools or 
a desire to protect liberal values, as is commonly assumed in the literature. 
The research revealed that while the literature and public debate have 
mainly dealt with the question of cultural defense being accepted or rejected 
by courts, two other central judicial decisions patterns exist.  First, the 
research indicated the existence of judicial decisions of cultural offense, 
namely cases in which judges regarded the cultural background as a 
consideration for a more severe punishment, as an indication of offense 
elements, or as a reason to reject a defense claim.  Second, the research 
revealed the judicial decision of disregard, namely cases in which the 
judges did not refer to cultural background in the decision on guilt and 
punishment (even though they were aware of it).  The research showed not 
 
146 One might claim that judges disregard cultural differences because they want to avoid 
taking a stand in sociopolitical issues in order to protect the legitimacy of the legal system, 
avoid public and professional criticism, or because they feared it might affect their chances 
of promotion.  It seems, however, that the reason for disregarded cases does not rest in the 
desire to avoid taking a sociopolitical stand.  If that were the case, it could be expected that 
judges would state that the issue of reaction to cultural differences should be dealt by the 
legislator rather than by the court.  However, there has been only one verdict with such a 
statement.  Moreover, in order to deal with cultural arguments without revealing their 
position in these sociopolitical issues, judges could rely on precedent. 
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only that those two judicial decisions patterns do exist but also that they are 
common in cultural conflict cases; in almost one-fifth of the cultural 
conflict cases, cultural background was considered offensively, and cultural 
background was disregarded in the decision in half of the cases.  The 
finding that these two judicial decision patterns are widespread judicial 
decisions in cultural conflict cases suggests that those scenarios should gain 
more academic and public attention. 
In almost one-fifth of the cultural conflict cases, cultural background 
was conconsiderd offensively against the defendant.  This is an important 
finding because it is commonly believed that cultural evidence is 
considered only in mitigation.  Though the possibility that the prosecution 
will raise cultural background offensively has occasionally been mentioned 
in the literature,147 this use of cultural background has not captured public 
or academic attention, where the focus has continued to be on cultural 
defense.  The finding that judges consider cultural background offensively 
in one out of five cases indicates that this judicial decision pattern of 
cultural offense should be a central issue in any discussion of cultural 
conflict cases. 
Though further studies are needed to examine whether the 
consideration of cultural background offensively characterizes court 
systems elsewhere, it is reasonable to assume that this phenomena is not 
unique to the Israeli court system because of the the similarities between the 
Israeli legal systems and other Western legal systems.148  There is also some 
evidence of cultural background being used offensively in the United States 
criminal court system.  Berger and Hein found 2 cases, out of 181 criminal 
and civil cases, in which the prosecution raised cultural evidence 
offensively.149  It is likely that the actual rate of the use of cultural 
background offensively is higher than reported in the Berger and Hein 
study, as the researchers examined how cultural evidence is raised before 
court but not how the cultural evidence was considered in the decision and 
because they referred to only two ethnic groups in American society, 
Hmong and Vietnamese. 
Since the offensive use of cultural background against the defendant 
seems to be a common judicial practice in cultural conflict cases, there is a 
need to examine whether this kind of judicial decision is a legitimate one.  
While legitimate reasons, such as protection of women’s rights, may inform 
the consideration of cultural background offensively, it seems that this is 
not the case.  The examination of judicial reasoning indicated that courts’ 
 
147 Berger & Hein, supra note 37, at 53-54; Roberts, supra note 53, at 97.  
148 See supra Part II. 
149 Berger & Hein, supra note 37, at 52-53. 
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negative attitudes in cultural conflict cases are strongly linked to power 
struggles between groups in society.  This raises questions regarding the 
legal and social legitimacy of considering cultural background against the 
accused.  For instance, what are the moral justifications for promoting the 
culture of a dominant group at the expense of the individual?  Is it the 
court’s role to promote assimilative policy?  Is cultural offense a form of 
discrimination? 
The question of discrimination comes up because in cultural conflict 
cases the group affiliation of the defendant is a consideration in the decision 
of whether to convict or to inflict more severe punishment.  One may claim, 
therefore, that the use of cultural background against the accused is 
discriminatory.  On the other hand, one may argue that the use of cultural 
background against the defendant is not discriminatory because the 
allegedly criminal actions of defendants from both dominant groups and 
minority groups are judged according to their cultures.  This may seem 
similar to the argument that cultural defense is not discriminatory since it 
allows all defendants to be judged according to their cultural code.150  This 
claim, however, does not apply to cases in which cultural background is 
considered offensively, due to the vast difference between considering 
cultural background against the accused and considering of cultural 
background in defense of the accused. 
The consideration of cultural background offensively and the 
consideration of cultural background defensively are, indeed, legally 
alike—in both cases cultural background is used to explain or contextualize 
actions of the accused in order to determine culpability and proper 
punishment.  There is, however, a profound difference between cases in 
which cultural background is considered defensively and in cases in which 
it is considered offensively.  In cases in which the background is considered 
defensively, the actions of the accused are interpreted in the context of the 
defendant’s culture and judged (at least in principle) according to his or her 
cultural norms.  In cases in which the background is considered offensively, 
the actions of the accused are interpreted in his or her cultural context, but 
the criterion according to which the behavior is judged is the culture of the 
dominant groups.  The fact that the cultural background is considered 
without recognizing that cultural differences justify special treatment 
implies that the practice of cultural offense is discriminatory, and hence, 
these discriminatory aspects should be examined further. 
This finding also has important implications for cultural defense 
advocates, defense attorneys, and legislators.  They all should recognize 
that raising a cultural defense in court might be counterproductive as courts 
 
150 See, e.g., Sing, supra note 19, at 1877-83; Winkelman, supra note 19, at 155. 
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may consider cultural background offensively against the defendant.  The 
awareness that cultural background may work against the defendant, for 
instance, may lead defense attorneys to avoid cultural defense arguments 
and, instead, to ask the court to ignore the cultural elements of the case 
altogether. 
The use of cultural evidence against the accused can ironically support 
the argument of cultural defense advocates for admission of cultural 
evidence through existing defenses.  When cultural background is 
considered offensively, cultural evidence is admitted as an indication of the 
defendant’s culpability and for determining the proper punishment.  
Advocates can, therefore, challenge any refusal to consider cultural defense 
arguments by asking how the refusal of cultural evidence for mitigation 
purposes can be legally justified, while the same evidence can be 
considered an indication of culpability or for imposing a more severe 
punishment. 
Another pattern revealed in the study that should gain more attention is 
the tendency of judges to disregard the cultural issue in the determination of 
guilt and punishment.  While this judicial decision pattern was not referred 
to in the literature on cultural conflict in criminal cases and was not 
expected at the outset, the research indicates that this type of judicial 
response was widespread.  In half of the cultural conflict cases examined, 
judges disregarded the cultural issue in the decision on guilt and 
punishment. 
The qualitative analysis of cases in which cultural background was 
disregarded shows that that this was a decision pattern of exclusion.  In 
cases in which cultural background was disregarded, judges excluded the 
cultural background by either defining the legal issue involved in a manner 
that made the cultural background irrelevant or framing the relevant events 
for the decision narrowly thus disconnecting them from the cultural context.  
This exclusion of the cultural issue prevents the discussion of social and 
political issues involved in cultural conflict cases, such as the existence of 
different value systems, which cultural group in society defines the criminal 
law, and what part courts play in the oppression of minority cultures. 
This judicial decision is obviously troubling for advocates of the 
recognition of cultural background as a mitigating circumstance.  In fact, 
they might be even more troubled by judges’ decisions to disregard cultural 
background than by decisions to reject cultural defense arguments.  It is 
easier to fight against rejection decisions, as they are overt and, therefore, 
open to legal and public criticism.  It is, however, harder to confront 
decisions to disregard cultural backgound as they are latent and, therefore, 
less subject to criticism.  These decisions are also more problematic because 
they exclude the cultural issue from the discourse and, hence, impede the 
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cultural defense view from becoming a prominent way of thinking among 
legal practitioners. 
Interestingly, the judicial decision to disregard a cultural issue is also 
problematic for those who oppose the use of cultural defense.  Whereas this 
judicial decision pattern does not recognize cultural background as 
mitigating circumstances, it lacks the condemnation of the cultural practice.  
This is problematic, for instance, for those who want to eliminate customs 
that violate women’s rights and, therefore, are interested in a clear message 
from the court against these harmful cultural practices. 
The judicial tendency to disregard the cultural issue is also important 
for the debate on the best way to raise cultural arguments: by using 
preexisting defenses or by establishing a separate cultural defense in the 
general part of the criminal code.  It seems that the widespread tendency of 
judges to disregard cultural arguments, as was found in this research, 
supports the demand for a specific cultural defense.  A formal, separate 
cultural defense will make it harder for the courts to ignore cultural 
arguments and will force them to take a stand on the cultural issue.  An 
explicit position of the court in cultural defense cases, answering the 
question of under what circumstances cultural evidence should be 
recognized as mitigating, is, as explained above, of mutual interest to 
supporters as well of opponents of cultural defense. 
The research findings also challenge the common explanation 
presented in the literature for courts’ tendency to avoid considering cultural 
evidence as a mitigating circumstance.  While the literature and public 
debate have mainly dealt with the issue as either a liberal dilemma or a legal 
issue, the research suggests that the proper framework for understanding 
courts’ attitudes toward cultural diversity cases is as conflicts between 
groups within a society. 
The literature has focused on an examination of the costs and benefits 
of cultural defenses, on identification of the right balance between 
conflicting values (for example, individual justice versus women’s rights), 
and a discussion of the legal means of raising cultural arguments in courts.  
Those areas of interest indicate that the prevailing perception is that lack of 
sufficient legal tools, lack of understanding of the cultural difference issue, 
or the will to protect liberal values are the reasons for courts’ reluctance to 
consider cultural differences as mitigating circumstances. 
The research findings indicate, however, that those are not the main 
reasons that courts fail to consider cultural background as mitigation.  The 
examination of judicial decisions in cultural conflict cases showed that legal 
constraints do not explain the decision to reject cultural defense arguments, 
to consider cultural backgound offensively, or to disregard the cultural 
issue.  The analysis of judicial reasoning in cultural conflict cases also 
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indicated that protection of liberal values was not a substantial 
consideration.  Judges rarely presented the protection of women’s rights and 
the equality principle as the reasons for rejection of cultural arguments or in 
support of more severe punishments. 
The research revealed a number of findings that indicate that courts’ 
attitudes toward cultural conflict cases was affected by the conflict between 
different groups in society.151  First, the qualitative analysis of judicial 
accounts indicated that the protection of the dominant groups’ status was a 
central factor that affected the decisions to reject cultural defense arguments 
or to use of cultural backgound against the defendant.  Second, from the 
qualitative analysis of cultural defense cases, it appears that judges tended 
to consider cultural arguments as mitigating when the case circumstances 
posed little threat to the dominant groups.  Third, the examination of cases 
 
151 One might suggest that the research findings could be also explained by the 
alternative paradigm to conflict perspective—the structural functionalist perspective.  It 
appears, however, that the structural functionalist perspective can only partially explain the 
research findings, so the conflict perspective is a more suitable framework to explain judicial 
decisions in cultural conflict cases. 
For instance, while it is possible to explain decisions that reject cultural arguments and 
decisions that use cultural background against the accused based on the structural 
functionalist perspective, this perspective fails to explain one of the research’s central 
findings that the most common decision was to disregard cultural background.  According to 
the structural functionalist perspective, the role of the law is integrative—to protect social 
cohesion, to present a framework for normative behavior, and to educate to accepted norms 
and values in the society.  See, e.g., ÉMILE DURKHEIM ET AL., THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL 
METHOD (1938); NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Elizabeth King & 
Martin Albrow trans., 1985); ADAM PODGÓRECKI, LAW AND SOCIETY (1974); Talcott 
Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in WILLIAM M. EVAN, LAW AND SOCIOLOGY: 
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 56 (1962).  
It is therefore difficult to explain using this perspective the finding that in half of the 
cases the decision was to disregard the cultural issue.  The courts would have fulfilled their 
role according to structural functionalist perspective much better if they had chosen to reject 
cultural claims or to consider cultural background offensively.  
Likewise, the findings regarding the reasons underlying the decisions in cultural 
conflict cases do not support the structural functionalist perspective.  According to this 
perspective, the reason for the courts’ negative attitudes towards cultural differences would 
be the will to instill common norms and values as a base for social cohesion.  The research 
has shown, indeed, that judges reasoned their decisions in terms of melting pot and social 
order terms that suit the structural functionalist perspective and stress social cohesion and 
social order.  Nevertheless, in-depth examination of the usage of those terms in the judicial 
texts does not support the structural functionalist perspective.  First, in all cases in which 
judges explained their decisions with melting pot policy, they also expressed concern with 
cultural superiority.  It, therefore, appears that behind the usage of melting pot reasoning 
stands the perception of cultural superiority and not a genuine fear that recognition of 
cultural diversity will undermine social cohesion.  Second, the analysis of the cases showed 
that when the judges used the term “social order” they meant the protection of the norms and 
values of the dominant group.  See supra Part III.C. 
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in which cultural background was disregarded showed that those cases were 
a judicial decision pattern of exclusion—an exclusion that prevented the 
discussion of the social and political issues involved in cultural conflict 
cases and that protected the existing power relations between groups in 
society. 
These findings suggest that the lack of consideration of cultural 
background as a mitigating circumstance is linked strongly to power 
relationships between groups within a society.  This Article suggests that 
judicial reaction to cultural conflict cases should be understood in the 
social-political context in which the courts operate.  It seems that the 
suitable theoretical framework for addressing the issue of judicial decisions 
in cultural conflict cases should be the conflict perspective and not only as 
liberal dilemma or as a legal issue, as it is commonly presented in the 
literature. 
This finding, that the tendency not to consider cultural evidence as a 
mitigating circumstance is related to power struggles in society, also has 
important implications for the course of action to be taken for those 
interested in promoting a cultural defense.  If the lack of consideration of 
cultural background as a mitigating circumstance is rooted in a lack of 
understanding or in a lack of suitable legal tools, the solution could come 
from the legislature or in better training of judges.  If, as the current 
research indicates, the reason for the lack of consideration is linked to the 
social-political structure, it will be not enough to drive for legal changes or 
to promote training for judges to bring change in courts’ attitude to cultural 
conflict cases.  It seems that courts will recognize the cultural defense only 
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